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Abstract 
The issue of child soldiers in contemporary times is overwhelming. It comes with 
incomprehensible consequences for those involved whether actively or passively. It is estimated that 
about 300, 000 children under the age of 18 are currently serving as child soldiers globally.1 Africa 
has been hardest hit by this phenomenon with more than 120,000 children under 18 years of age 
currently participating in armed conflicts across the continent, some no more than 7 or 8 years of 
age.2  
However, Africa is not the only continent where children are involved in armed conflict. Research 
has revealed that up to a forth of the 300,000 children are found in the East Asia and Pacific region 
and many more have served as soldiers in countries no longer facing armed conflict.3  
Ongoing conflicts in various parts of the world continue to pose a danger to the recruitment of 
children despite international outcry and legal instruments that forbid the exercise. It is reported that 
military recruitment of children (under-18) and their use in hostilities still takes place in one form or 
another in at least 86 countries and territories worldwide.4  
Despite the long period of conflict in the Sudan, the phenomenon of child soldiery has not 
sufficiently been delved into. Scholarly literature on the issue mostly covers African countries like 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda (particularly northern 
Uganda), just to mention but a few. In the few occasions that Sudan is mentioned, it is to refer to 
various aspects of the conflict and usually the child soldier issue is pushed to the periphery.  
 In an attempt to cover this desideratum, this thesis examines the child soldier phenomenon 
in Sudan, particularly the reintegration of former child soldiers back into their respective 
                                                 
1
 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Global Report on Child Soldiers: Global Report 2001 (London; United 
Kingdom: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, April 2001) <http://www.child-soldiers.org/library/global-
reports?root_id=159&directory_id=215> [accessed 18 July 2010]; UNICEF, Adult Wars, Child Soldiers: Voices of 
Children Involved in Armed Conflict in the East Asia and Pacific Region (UNICEF East Asia and Pacific Regional 
Office, Thailand: United Nations Children's Fund, 2001), p. 8 
<http://www.unicef.org/sowc06/pdfs/pub_adultwars_en.pdf> [accessed 19 July 2010]. 
2
 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, p. 14. 
3
 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers; UNICEF, pp. 8-9. 
4
 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, ‘Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008’ (Coalition to Stop the Use of 
Child Soldiers: London, 2003), p. 398 
<http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/files/country_pdfs/FINAL_2008_Global_Report.pdf>. 
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communities. The thesis intends to examine different aspects of reintegration to provide in depth 
information on the process.  
Specifically, it aspires to answer the question why the reintegration of former child soldiers in Sudan 
is basically failing when its success is so fundamental to the future of the country especially if peace 
has to prevail. 
 
 vii 
Zusammenfassung 
Reintegration von Kindersoldaten – eine globale Herausforderung 
für die Kinderrechte: Der Fall des Sudans 
 Der Einsatz von Kindern und Jugendlichen in kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen ist 
bereits für den dreißigjährigen Krieg belegt. Durch die Veröffentlichung von Bildern und Berichten 
des unfassbaren Leides, das vielen Kindersoldaten widerfahren ist, geriet dieses Thema erstmals in 
den 90er Jahren in den Blickpunkt der Weltöffentlichkeit und gilt heute als eine der extremsten 
Formen ausbeuterischer Kinderarbeit5. Trotz internationaler Proteste und eindeutiger Rechtslage 
werden nach wie vor Kinder für kriegerische Handlungen von regulären oder nichtregulären 
bewaffneten Gruppen rekrutiert und an der Waffe ausgebildet. Schätzungen zufolge sind zurzeit 
circa 300.000 Kinder und Jugendliche, die das achtzehnte Lebensjahr noch nicht erreicht haben, 
unter Waffen in Konflikte involviert;6 wobei die Zahl derer, die auf Reintegrationsmaßnahmen 
angewiesen sind, sehr viel größer ist. Dazu gehören vor allem ehemalige Kindersoldaten, die 
entweder das achtzehnte Lebensjahr überschritten haben, oder aber nicht länger an Konflikten 
beteiligt sind. 
 Obgleich Afrika nicht der einzige Kontinent ist, in dem es zu Rekrutierung von Kindern 
kommt, __ ist er doch von dieser Problematik am stärksten betroffen. Etwas weniger als die Hälfte 
aller Kindersoldaten weltweit befinden sich in Afrika (ca. 120.000)7. Die meisten Kinder werden aus 
kriegstaktischen und finanziellen Gründen zwangsrekrutiert; jedoch schließen sich vor allem 
Jugendliche auch freiwillig einer bewaffneten Gruppe an, die vermeintlichen Schutz, Zugehörigkeit 
und eine Stärkung des Selbstwertes durch Macht verspricht. Begünstigt wird dieser Umstand durch 
                                                 
5
 International Labour Organisation (ILO), ‘Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No.182)’ 
<http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/appl-
displayConv.cfm?conv=C182&hdroff=1&lang=EN> [accessed 20 July 2010]. 
6
 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers; UNICEF, p. 8. 
7
 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 14. 
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Faktoren wie extreme Armut, ___ Tod der eigenen Familie und/oder die Zerstörung des eigenen 
Dorfes. 
 Die Rekrutierung von Kindersoldaten speziell im Sudan wurde trotz des dort 
langanhaltenden Bürgerkrieges bis heute nicht hinreichend untersucht. Die wissenschaftliche 
Literatur befasst sich hauptsächlich mit afrikanischen Ländern wie zum Beispiel Sierra Leone, 
Liberia oder der Demokratischen Republik Kongo. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird der Versuch 
unternommen, dem Desiderat einer näheren Erforschung der Kindersoldaten im Sudan Rechnung 
zu tragen. Insbesondere soll die Frage geklärt werden, weshalb Versuche zur Reintegration von 
Kindersoldaten scheiterten. 
Im Gegensatz zu früheren Kriegen, die zwischen souveränen Staaten um die Ausweitung oder 
Verteidigung der Landesgrenzen geführt wurden, ist die Mehrzahl der Konflikte des 21.Jahrhunderts 
innerstaatlich. Diese Konflikte sind kennzeichnend für einen zerfallenden Staat - mit Gruppen 
unterschiedlicher Identitäten - in dem das Gewaltmonopol nicht länger gewährleistet werden kann. 
Im Verlauf eines solchen Konfliktes erlischt die staatliche Macht zusehends. Das staatliche 
Gewaltmonopol wird von Privatarmeen verdrängt und es entstehen kriegsökonomische Strukturen, 
bei denen sich diese Armeen durch den Verkauf von Rohstoffen finanzieren.  
 Wie die meisten afrikanischen Länder befindet sich auch der Sudan in einer postkolonialen 
Krise. Die lange Zeit der Akkulturation an fremde Normen und Gebräuche, sowie die teilweise 
willkürliche Festlegung der Landesgrenzen, welche auf ethnische Gruppen wenig Rücksicht nahm, 
erschwert die kulturelle Identitätsfindung des Landes. Nach seiner Unabhängigkeit im Jahre 1956 
rutschte der Sudan in einen Bürgerkrieg. Die im Süden beheimateten schwarzafrikanischen Ethnien, 
größtenteils Dinka, Schilluk und Nuer, fühlten sich gegenüber dem moslemisch-arabisch geprägten 
Norden benachteiligt und forderten machtpolitische Gleichberechtigung und im laufe der Zeit einen 
unabhängigen Süd-Sudan. Seit seiner Unabhängigkeit befand sich das Land 26 Jahre lang im 
Bürgerkrieg. Das durch die ägyptische und britische Kolonisation noch immer geprägte politische 
Denken, die Unterstützung des Nord-Sudans durch die USA und die Unterstützung des Süd-Sudans 
durch die Sowjetunion während des Kalten Krieges, Bestrebungen des Nordens zur massiven 
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Islamisierung des Landes, zahlreiche ethnische Konflikte vor allem im Süden und nicht zuletzt das 
ökonomische Interesse an dem Zugang zu Ressourcen erhalten den Konflikt seit der 
Unabhängigkeit mit unterschiedlicher Intensität aufrecht. Die Unterzeichnung eines umfassenden 
Friedenabkommens (CPA) zwischen Khartum im Norden und der SPLM im Süden am 
9. Januar 20058__ beendete vorläufig den langen Konflikt zwischen Nord- und Süd-Sudan. 
 Die hohe Zahl der Kindersoldaten im Sudan, zeugt von der großen Intensität des Nord-Süd-
Konfliktes. Kinder werden sowohl von staatlicher als auch von nichtstaatlicher Seite für 
Kampfeinsätze rekrutiert. Die Rekrutierung wird oftmals begünstigt durch die persönliche Situation 
des Kindes –  Armut, Heimat- und Familienlosigkeit oder das Bedürfnis des Kindes nach Schutz 
oder Rache können hierbei eine entscheidende Rolle spielen. Die Zwangsrekrutierung findet vor 
allem aus kriegstaktischen und finanziellen Gründen statt. Für Kinder werden weniger 
Verpflegungs- und Materialkosten benötigt und sie lassen sich leichter manipulieren. Durch brutalen 
militärischen Drill sowie ideologische und religiöse Indoktrination werden die Kinder zu Soldaten 
ausgebildet, die blind ihrem Befehlshaber ergeben sind. Vor allem aber die lange Dauer des 
Konfliktes lässt die Zahl der Kindersoldaten wachsen. Mit der Zeit entwickeln sich 
kriegsökonomische Strukturen. Viele kennen nur das Leben des Kriegs- und Krisenalltags, und 
durch die auszehrenden Jahre des Bürgerkrieges fehlt es an erwachsenen Rekruten. Der 
technologische Fortschritt bringt außerdem massive, leichtgewichtige und leicht zu handhabende 
Waffen hervor, deren Bedienung auch für Kinder möglich ist.9 
 Der Konflikt im Sudan könnte jederzeit wieder aufflammen. Die ethnischen, kulturellen, 
religiösen und politischen Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Gruppen bestehen weiterhin. Auch 
wenn bewaffnete Konflikte weitgehend ausbleiben sollten, steht das Land vor großen 
Herausforderungen. Die Reintegration der Kindersoldaten ist eine von ihnen.  
                                                 
8
 Government of the Sudan (CPA), ‘The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Sudan People's Liberation Army’ 
<http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf> [accessed 18 July 2010]. 
9
 Diese nach wie vor weit verbreiteten Kleinwaffen sind ein Überbleibsel aus der Zeit des Kalten Krieges, in der sie 
den jeweiligen Konfliktparteien von den Großmächten geliefert wurden. 
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Einen Ansatz zur Reintegration der Kindersoldaten bieten die sogenannten DDR-Programme 
(Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration), die in drei aufeinander aufbauende Maßnahmen 
gegliedert sind: 
1. Entwaffnung: Einsammeln von Waffen im Konfliktgebiet, mit anschließender Verwahrung 
oder Zerstörung der Waffen  
2. Demobilisierung: begleitete und kontrollierte Entlassung der Kindersoldaten aus den 
bewaffneten Gruppen 
3. Reintegration: Rückkehr und Wiedereinführung der Kinder in ihre Familien und das zivile 
Leben  
Zusätzlich ist für die Kinder eine Traumabehandlung existentiell.  
 Oft werden lokal übliche Rituale zur Reintegration der Kinder in die Gemeinschaft 
durchgeführt. Wie zum Beispiel bei dem Stamm der Dinka Bahr el Ghazal. Das Ritual, bei dem ein 
Huhn, eine Ziege oder ein Stier geschlachtet wird, wird von einem „Speermann“ (beny bith in 
Dinka) geleitet. Das Kind soll dabei von den Geistern der Toten gereinigt werden, die es im Kampf 
auf sich geladen hat und die Gemeinschaft vor dem Zorn der Geister schützen. 
Rituale zur Aufnahme von ehemaligen Kindersoldaten sind hilfreich. Sie haben einen emotionalen 
und psychologischen Effekt, und die Kinder fühlen sich zugehörig und aufgenommen in die 
Gemeinschaft. Die Erfahrung hat jedoch gezeigt, dass Rituale allein nicht ausreichen das Leben 
eines Kindes vollständig zu stabilisieren. Zusätzlich müssen Berufs- und Bildungsmaßnahmen eine 
Zukunftsperspektive geben. In Schulen oder Ausbildungsstätten erfahren sich Kinder als Teil der 
Schülergemeinschaft und werden zusätzlich sozial stabilisiert. Sie bekommen die Chance persönliche 
Talente und Fähigkeiten kennenzulernen und zu trainieren, was auch das Selbstwertgefühl steigern 
kann. 
 Im Sudan fehlen derartige Bildungseinrichtungen weitgehend und die Kinder werden mit 
ihrer Situation oft allein gelassen. Viele schließen sich Banden an, flüchten sich in Drogen, werden 
kriminell oder prostituieren sich. Der noch immer anhaltende Konflikt in Darfur, im Westen des 
 xi
Sudans, macht diese ehemaligen Kindersoldaten extrem anfällig für eine erneute Rekrutierung durch 
irreguläre bewaffnete Gruppen. 
Die Reintegration der Kindersoldaten ist eine der Voraussetzungen für ein Ende der Gewaltspirale 
im Sudan. 
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Statement of  Purpose 
 This research has selected Sudan as the object of study, neither because of it’s proximity to 
my country of origin – Kenya, nor because I lived and worked there, but because relevant literature 
on the country has not comprehensively explored the issue of child soldiers. The fact that the 
country has suffered internal conflicts for more than two decades only goes to show how profound 
an exploitation, in social, political, economic and even human rights terms it has faced.  
That children were used in the Sudanese civil wars is a fact that cannot be ignored and their 
reintegration provides a good entry point to explore the challenge of peace building in “post-
conflict”10 Sudan.  
 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed on 9 January 2005, officially ended the 
conflict between the government, based in the country’s northern town of Khartoum and rebel 
groups in the southern part, largely dominated by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A). The signature of the CPA brought with it the challenge of rebuilding the country’s 
much-destroyed infrastructure, an onerous challenge in this day and age. 
So enormous is the burden of reconstruction that Sudan alone cannot adequately deal with it given 
the paucity in its resources. The challenge then becomes global and includes local, regional and 
international actors, hence the global perspective of this research. 
 Child soldiery being an equally new but widespread phenomenon in the international front 
and scholarship as well, makes it an interesting but challenging topic to tackle. This paper aspires to 
contribute to existing literature not only by attempting to cover the lacuna created by the non-
representation of Sudan, but also to bring to the fore the child soldier phenomenon in the country 
through the lens of reintegration of former child soldiers and its challenges. 
                                                 
10
 It is difficult to talk of a wholly post-conflict Sudan as Darfur is still engulfed in active conflict. However, post-
conflict in the case refers to the fact that the larger part of the country is not involved in active conflict as this was 
brought to an end by the signature of the CPA in 2005. 
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I wasn’t a boy. I was a soldier, and at night my dreams haunted me 
more than they ever had. I missed my AK-47 and wanted a pistol to 
keep me safe. 
 
Emmanuel Jal, former Sudanese child soldier.11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Emmanuel Jal, Warchild: A Boy Soldier's Story (Little, Brown, 2009), p. 188. 
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Figure 1: Map of the Sudan as at mid 2010  
(Adopted from ‘map of Oil and Human Rights,’ Rightsmaps.com)12 
 
                                                 
12
 ‘Sudan overview map’ <http://www.rightsmaps.com/html/sudmap1.html> [accessed 18 July 2010]. 
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Chapter 1:  Sowing Seeds of  Conflict: Nature of  the Colonial 
and Post-colonial Sudanese State 
1.1  Bilad es Sudan: A Brief History of the Conflict in Sudan 
The Sudan, Bilad es Sudan ‘the land of the blacks’, as was the name given to it by medieval 
Arabs to the negro belt which stretched across Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and 
the Indian Ocean, is a land with its own history.13  
Since medieval times to date, the country has undergone numerous geographical and physical 
changes.  
The country, as we know it today can be divided into four geographical regions; the northern plains, 
which mainly comprise desert rock and sand and which cover the largest area, and constitute a part 
of the Sahara desert, the northwestern corridor characterised by flat-topped hills and interrupted by 
steep-sided gullies and sand dunes, clusters of beehive-shaped hills dominate the central part of the 
country and lastly, the southern part which is largely a plateau, the eastern half of which is covered 
by massive mountains such as the Immatong range.14 
Historically, Sudan has had two different imperial powers, Turco-Egyptian, as well as Anglo-
Egyptian. It has had two periods of independence: first when the Mahdist state (1885-1898) is 
recalled and that since 1956 when Sudan attained its independence from the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium rule.  
This research will capitalise on the period of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of 1899-1956 and 
the developments thereafter that are believed to have intensified the Sudanese conflict.  
Some reference will nonetheless be made to the Turco-Egyptian rule of 1820-1865 and the Mahdist 
Interlude of 1885-1898 to emphasise certain important points. 
                                                 
13
 Anthony John Arkell, A history of the Sudan: from the earliest times to 1821 (University of London, Athlone 
Press, 1955), p. 1. 
14
 Catherine Jendia, The Sudanese civil conflict, 1969-1985 (Peter Lang, 2002), p. 5. 
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1.1.1 The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1899-1956  
Egyptian invasion of Sudan begun in 1820 and was intended to provide Egypt with a steady 
supply of gold and slave soldiers to sustain its military. The northern Sudanese people of Nubia, 
Kordofan and the Red Sea were the first to be conquered by the Egyptian army and to be coerced 
into collaboration with Egypt.15  
Douglas Johnson informs us that this period marked the beginning of the North-South divide in 
Sudan and was characterised by the impoverishment of some areas of the northern Sudan through 
new forms of taxation and ownership which then contributed to the dramatic expansion of slavery 
and slave-owning. Within the structure of the Turco-Egyptian Empire, Muslims among the 
indigenous population benefited more than the non-Muslims.16  
Slave raiding reached its peak in the South in the early 1870s during the Turkiyya (the Turco-
Egyptian regime in Sudan) when the slave population in the North was drawn very largely from the 
South of Sudan and in the popular mind slaves and ‘blacks’ were synonymous17.  
The Mahdist state (1885-98), which overthrew the Turco-Egyptian regime built on a pattern of 
segregation between the people in the North of the country (henceforth, the North) and those in the 
South (henceforth, the South) already established by the previous Turco-Egyptian regime.  
 
 The Anglo-Egyptian “Condominium”18 Agreement was signed in 1899.19 By this Agreement, 
Britain and Egypt would share the governance of Sudan; the Governor-General, appointed and 
recalled by the Khedive (formally or informally used to refer to the Viceroy) of Egypt would be the 
chief administrator but only act on the advice of the British government.20 Under the Condominium, 
Sudan was divided into provinces, their number and boundaries were changed over the years. Each 
was headed by a governor (mudir) answerable to the Governor-General through the various 
                                                 
15
 See Douglas Hamilton Johnson, The root causes of Sudan's civil wars (James Currey Publishers, 2003), p. 4. 
16
 Johnson, p. 5. 
17
 Johnson, p. 6. 
18
 A condominium it was but the British dominated over the Egyptians to the extent that it could be alleged that 
Sudan was under British rule rather than a Condominium. 
19
 Peter Malcolm Holt and M. W. Daly, The history of the Sudan: from the coming of Islam to the present day 
(Westview Press, 1979). 
20
 Robert O. Collins, A history of modern Sudan (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), see p.33. 
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departments21. As stated above, southern Sudan had been neglected during the Mahdiyya, the Anglo-
Egyptian administration followed suit and developed distinctly different patterns of governance in 
the South and in the North. For instance, there was a fairly quick transition from military occupation 
to civil administration in the North before World War One: civilian British officials replaced all 
military governors in the Northern provinces, and the police took over responsibility for rural 
security from the army.22 However, the situation in the South was different as the Mahdists had had 
virtually no control over the region and there was no need therefore for the Anglo-Egyptian 
administration to wean people away from Mahdism by offering rewards for renewing their loyalty to 
the then government23. Douglas Johnson further points out two main reasons that contributed to a 
longer ‘pacification’ in the South than in the North, he argues: 1) that the Anglo-Egyptian 
government did not have to negotiate local alliances against a variety of competitors as it had done 
in the North; and 2) the re-established Governor-Generalate for the whole of Sudan, centred in 
Khartoum, was remote from the South in physical distance and in its guiding preoccupations.24 
Moreover, political management of Islam was the only policy available in northern Sudan, but in the 
South, even as the jallaba (Arab/s) continued to spread Islam, massive conversion proved 
impossible.  
 Seeking to build a bulwark against the spread of Islam, Sir Reginal Wingate the Governor-
General of the Condominium (1861-1953) and his subordinates encouraged Christian missionaries 
to convert the southern Sudanese from their traditional religions to Christianity, teach them English, 
discourage the use of Arabic, and even prohibit the wearing of Arabic clothing.25 
The Egyptian revolution of 1919 and subsequent negotiations reinforced Britain’s strategic 
interest in the Sudan.26 As a consequence of the revolution, British Officials firmly discouraged any 
recognition or expansion of the new educated class of Sudanese and instead proposed and 
encouraged a system of Indirect Rule whereby the functions of governance would not descend to 
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the educated Sudanese elite but be left to traditional tribal authorities with a British resident to 
advice them. This was intended to discourage resistance from the locals who then would not easily 
question rules brought forth to them.  
 In 1922, the government promulgated the Passports and Permits Ordinance, which declared 
much of the South Closed Districts.27 Gradually, many more ordinances and regulations further 
segregating the North from the South were reinforced and slowly but surely,  ‘the combination of all 
these ordinances and rudimentary institutions to exclude Muslims and Islam from the South, while 
isolating Southerners themselves became known as the Southern Policy’28. Though the Southern Policy 
encouraged the use of English to replace Arabic, and Christian mission schools, it failed to eradicate 
northern influence entirely and produced understandable fears amongst the already existing northern 
intelligentsia of a plan to attach the South to East Africa, while it deliberately sought to avoid 
educational steps which might produce such intelligentsia in the South.29  
In general, there had been little negative reaction among the Sudanese to the Egyptian 
revolution. The British Government interpreted that as being a sign of Sudanese desire to end 
Egypt’s participation in the country. However, they were wrong as ‘the first of a series of Sudanese 
political organisations to appear after the war (World War I) was the League of Sudan Union in 
1920, which in its anonymous circulars took a decidedly anti-British position’30. For example, in 
1922, an ex-army officer of Dinka origins, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Latif, was arrested and imprisoned for 
submitting to the Hadara newspaper an article calling for ‘self-determination of the Sudanese.’31 
After his release in 1923, together with several other government employees, he founded the White 
Flag League, ironically with Egyptian financial assistance. 
Meanwhile, the colonial administration continued investing considerably in the political, 
economic, social and cultural development of the North hoping that they would agree to adopt 
Christianity among other things while the South remained subject to isolation and violence.  
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It is no wonder that the North was the main centre of Sudanese nationalism after the Second World 
War. This is seen in the way that, at the time of independence in 1956, the post of Prime Minister 
was held by Isma’il al-Azhari, “father of the new Sudan,” a northerner although his tenure in office 
lasted just a few months.  
1.1.2 Sudan after Independence 
 After independence (in 1956), the problem of segregation and underdevelopment of the 
South became apparent and there were numerous calls on the government to deal with the issue. 
Unfortunately, successive northern-dominated governments, both civilian and military were 
unsuccessful in handling the ‘southern problem’, ranging from neglect to attempts to reverse the 
British isolation by enforced Arabisation and Islamisation.32 This only resulted to animosity and 
between the two regions and political resistance from the South. For instance, on 8 July 1965 
northern troops at Juba went on Rampage and left hundreds of southern residents dead and whole 
sections of the town in ashes while on the 11th of the same month, a further mass killing of 
southerners occurred in Wau (presently a city in southern Sudan and the capital of west Bahr el 
Ghazal state. Refer to the map of Sudan above).33While the government reacted by restating its 
policy that lawlessness must be crushed and order restored, the Anyanya (a rebel group in the South, 
and later a generically used term to refer to southern armed resistance movement/groups) with arms 
acquired through the Congo and from other foreign sources, responded to the new government 
offensively causing atrocities all over the country.  
Resistance continued until 1969 when on 25 May 1969, Colonel Ja’far Nimeiri took over the 
government of Sudan in a coup. The regime announced that it would follow a radical pan-Arab 
path, and imprisoned all the leaders of traditional parties except those of the Communist Party who 
declared their support for the regime.34 The regime also sought to find a solution to the southern 
problem. To this effect an agreement between the government and the Southern Sudan Liberation 
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Movement (SSLM) was concluded in Addis Ababa in February 1972. The agreement, commonly 
known as the Addis Ababa Agreement, was incorporated into the constitution the following year. It, 
not only brought peace to Sudan (for a while), but , as a unique resolution to the civil war never 
before achieved in post-colonial Africa, brought great international acclaim to Sudan and its 
leaders.35  
However, the agreement was seen as a failure by most southern Sudanese. For instance, there was a 
clear difference of understanding between the government and the SSLM delegations about the 
‘regional autonomy’ then proposed for negotiation. ‘Autonomy,’ to the SSLM, meant federation, and 
they came (to the meeting in Addis Ababa) armed with a proposal for a full federal structure. 
Contrary to their expectation they were offered and accepted something far less in what became the 
Southern Regional Government.36  
The Addis Ababa Agreement was neither popular in the North nor in the South.  
In the North, politicians thought that the Agreement gave too many concessions to the South and 
were therefore against it. Those who detested it most were of course those who favoured an Islamic 
state, most pronounced were; the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the 
Muslim Brothers. These parties saw the Agreement, and the 1973 Constitution into which it was 
incorporated, as an obstacle to the creation of such a state.37 It must be noted that most of these 
parties were deeply disappointed because they had been displaced by Nimeiri in the 1969 Coup.  
In the South, southern leaders continued to be criticised by the people for accepting an agreement 
with poor terms. These, coupled with lack of commitment to the Agreement by northern parties and 
resistance from various political and armed groups in the North made Nimeiri’s regime unpopular. 
Most visible opponents in the South then were the Anyanya.  
The Anyanya, later, Anyanya-2, comprised of many guerrilla bands that operated in the south 
between 1980-3. In 1983, the ex-Anyanya-2 soldiers, the Sudanese Army Battalion members 
absorbed from the original Anyanya, commonly known as battalion 105 (which had its garrisons at 
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Bor, Pibor and pochalla) merged under one Commander, John Garang de Mabior to form the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). 
Ideologically, the SPLM/A was from the outset radical and sophisticated. Though based in the 
South, it was not secessionist but stood instead for a notion of a ‘new Sudan’ in which there could 
be federalism or regionalism, just as long as central domination by a ‘ruling clique’ was prevented.38 
In this vein, one of their immediate problems was Nimeiri, and their strategy was to overthrow him.  
Acknowledging the physical and geographical interconnectedness between the south and the north, 
the movement called for a ‘revolution’ in the country rather than a separation of the two areas. In 
their manifesto,39 they called for the redress of various issues among them, under-development or 
the so-called “problem of Southern Sudan,” racism, tribalism and ethnicity. 
However, the introduction of Islamic sharia law by the Nimeiri government in September 
1983 created further unrest in the country particularly in the South where majority of them were 
non-Muslims. From then onwards through to 1985, there were massive anti-government 
demonstrations that the government could no longer contain.  
Realising that the situation wasn’t getting any better, the then commander-in-chief of the army, 
‘General Abdul Rahman Swar al-Dahab, eventually took control of the country as head of the 
Transitional Military Council (TMC) on 6 April, overthrowing president Nimeiri who was on a trip 
in the USA’40.  
In 1986, the first “democratic general elections” were held in Sudan with the Umma Party wining 
most seats in parliament, but could not form government on its own, so a coalition government had 
to be formed under the leadership of Sayyid Sadiq al-Mahdi. It was comprised of a new council of 
ministers majorly from the Umma Party, followed by the DUP (Democratic Unionist Party), and 
other smaller parties like the NIF (National Islamic Front, which later, in 1998 became National 
Congress Party (NCP)). 
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The TMC handed over power to the coalition government soon after the elections. 
However, it is reported that between 1986 and 1989 the coalition government failed to address 
critical matters affecting the country then: the deteriorating economy, the on-going war in the South 
and the issues concerning sharia law among other things. To make matters worse, neither the (TMC) 
nor the subsequent elected government was able to reach a settlement with the SPLM/A leaving the 
southern problem unresolved.  
On June 30 1989, a radical Islamic faction in the military took over in yet another coup. This 
time under the leadership of General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, whose Islamist policies have 
been said to have ‘widened the cleavage with the SPLM-SPLA and sharpened the issues and options 
confronting the nation’41.  
From then on conflict pursued in Sudan especially in the South with the SPLA/M championing the 
notion of a ‘new Sudan’ on the one hand and the government and allied politicians in the North 
maintaining that ‘Islam, the majority religion and Arabic the language of the Quran represent bases 
for the Country’s nationalism and should define its legal, political and economic systems,’42 on the 
other hand.  
That is not to say that the conflict in Sudan has since then only been fought on these lines but as 
outlined above, on different, sometimes very distinct and controversial lines that are deep rooted in 
the country’s history. 
 These conflicts were only brought to a halt in 2005 by the signing of the landmark 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by the National Congress Party (NCP) officially headed by 
president Omar el Bashir (who is still the incumbent president of Sudan at the time of writing this 
thesis-2010), and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) headed by Dr. John 
Garang who passed on shortly after the signature of the agreement.  
It is from this point in time that this research takes off as only after the signing of the CPA was 
there a permanent ceasefire in Sudan. With the presumption that after the CPA a large part of the 
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Sudanese territory was no longer in active warfare, this thesis aspires to delve deeper into the 
situation of former child soldiers and particularly their reintegration back into society after being 
demobilised from armed forces and rebel groups. It will also take into account their experiences in 
combat given the long period of conflict the country has experienced. 
1.2 Relevance of History  
 The main aim of burrowing into the archives of Sudanese history is to locate this research in 
a historical context and to understand the root causes of conflict in the country.  
This historical backdrop will be vital in understanding the point at which the conflict in Sudan is at 
presently in the theoretical discourse tackled in the following chapter. 
 A deeper look at the history of the country disapproves popular notion that the conflict 
there was between the Islamic north and largely Christian and animist south. As observed, there 
were many points of contention that brought about the conflict among them the neglect of the 
South in terms of development, segregation of the country and administering it as two separate 
blocks-North and South and the consequent encouragement of Christianity and the use of English 
in the South, while Islam and the use of Arabic remained dominant in the North. These are just a 
few of the main triggers of the conflict.  
 Quintessential to this thesis is the fact that some of these problems were conceived during 
the Turco-Egyptian period and passed down to the Anglo-Egyptian period of rule. So there is not 
only a conception of problems in the early colonial period but also fertile ground for their evolution 
and maturity which culminated into clear-cut differences between northern and southern Sudan in 
the later stages of the condominium in the early 1950s.  
 The independent Sudanese state, we may conclude, inherited a host of problems from the 
previous imperial powers. These problems were not only characterised by the North-South divide 
but also by administrative shortcomings. The Anglo-Egyptian rule, dominated by the British was 
essentially a military-administrative unit which relied heavily on police forces to ensure order is 
maintained. Administration also followed a system of dictatorship where oppressive rules and 
 14 
ordinance were put in place for the subjects to follow without question. This is one reason why 
British administrators forged for the exclusion of the Sudanese elite class and preferred local 
“uneducated” leaders whose capacity to question their authority was negligible.  
 Against this backdrop, the post-colonial state had to face numerous issues, most of which 
were alien in nature hence failure of successive governments to resolve fundamental and contentious 
issues in the country. The result of this negligence was a dilemma in governance that slowly led to 
massive dissatisfaction and ultimate civil war in Sudan.  
The length of time the civil war has lasted is also imperative to this paper as it emphasises the 
constant demand for combatants and in cases where adults combatants were ‘lacking in supply’ then 
child soldiers were used in their stead. 
Noteworthy is also the point that dialogue between northern and southern elites failed to work 
because both sides held strong to their beliefs and a compromise was difficult to find in the 
aftermath of independence. The South took to arms in what could be seen as a last desperate resort 
to have its voice heard.  
1.3  The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)43 at a Glance 
The CPA, signed in 2005, provided for a six-month pre-interim period followed by a six-year 
interim period during which the NCP and the SPLM/A would share power. At the expiry of this 
period, a referendum would take place to give a chance for southern Sudan to vote on self-
determination. The referendum is expected to take place next year (2010).  
In the interim, the CPA established a transitional government of national unity (GoNU) based in 
Khartoum and a semi-autonomous government of southern Sudan (GoSS) based in Juba. 
The CPA also provided that the national and southern governments would share power, wealth and 
resources but would maintain separate constitutions, armies, budgets and laws. It therefore required 
that armed groups either join the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) or the SPLA by 2006. To this 
effect, a declaration on unity and integration was signed in Juba in 2006 between the SPLA and the 
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South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), which was mostly comprised of southern Sudan militias 
previously backed by the Khartoum government to help reintegrate combatants in the south. 
However reports indicate rising tensions as the integration process is still incomplete.  
 Funds for development would also be availed by GoNU and the areas most hard hit by war 
would be prioritised. In allocating the funds to the war-affected areas and least developed areas, the 
National Reconstruction and Development Fund (NRDF) would use the effects of war and level of 
development as the main criteria. Those areas singled out include Southern Kordofan/Nuba 
Mountains and Blue Nile.  
In the oil-rich area of Abyei, the CPA provided it special status. The CPA, in the Abyei 
Protocol, provided for shared governance, an interim oil-revenue sharing plan and a chance for the 
region to decide on whether to join what might be an independent southern Sudan in the 2011 
referendum. Regrettably, it is reported that in 2005, in violation of the CPA, the NCP rejected the 
Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC)  report44 on the demarcation of the region.  
Despite signature of the CPA and the consequent permanent ceasefire and peaceful dialogue 
in the country, violence continued in Darfur. To date, the government has failed to stop the violence 
in the area, largely because it is involved in it and its impartiality compromised. 
The division in provisions provided for in the CPA (between north and southern Sudan) has 
been taken note of in this paper. However, the time period in question (2005-2010) is one in which 
the NCP and the SPLM share power under a united government of national unity hence one 
Sudanese government and therefore one country-Sudan, as is implied in this paper.  
Accordingly, this paper will examine the child soldier phenomenon in the context of Sudan, 
combining elements of the issue from both the northern and southern parts in one melting pot it 
recognises as the Republic of the Sudan, the Sudan or just Sudan. Specifics of the CPA relating to 
children, particularly child soldiers will be tackled in chapter 4 below. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Discourse and Methodological Scope 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
2.1.1 Conflict Resolution/ Post-conflict Peace Building 
Internal (intra-state) conflicts as opposed to external (inter-state) conflicts have been a major 
occurrence in Africa in the post-cold war era. So numerous are these conflicts in the continent that 
some scholars ask whether violence is inevitable in Africa.45  
Nevertheless, it is only fair to note that the number of armed conflicts in Africa has greatly reduced 
in recent times – for instance between the year 2000 and 2002, it is reported that there were 18 
active wars in the continent. As of February 2008, there were only 5 active wars and armed conflicts 
ongoing in the continent: Sudan (Darfur region), Kenya (post-election violence between December 
2007 and February 2008), Somalia (excluding Somaliland), DR Congo (eastern region) and Chad.46 
Sudan provides perhaps the worst example as it has suffered several internal conflicts for about 
twenty one years after its independence. The big question we need to ask here is what the term 
conflict really means? 
Johan Galtung defines conflict as ‘an action-system with two or more incompatible goal-
states,’47 whereby an action-system refers to a system of actors.  
More specifically conflict can be understood as a situation in which two or more actors, who interact 
with each other, pursue incompatible goals, are aware of this incompatibility, and claim to be 
justified in their pursuit of their particular course of action.48  
War, on the other hand, refers to international and internal armed conflict and situations of 
militarised violence that may amount to de facto armed conflict. Given that the conflict in Sudan was 
internal, it qualifies to be called a civil/communal war. As a matter of fact most Sudanese refer to 
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the conflict or civil war that took place in their country simply as ‘the war’. In the same vein, this 
paper shall use the terms war and conflict interchangeably to refer to one and the same thing in the 
Sudanese context. Talking of war in its strict sense of ongoing militarised violence, then we are 
talking of a period of violence in Sudan that started in the early 1980s and ensued through to the 
year 2005 when the CPA was signed. 
 Though the Sudanese conflict had many actors, pursuing various goals, sometimes even 
deemed noble in each actors ayes, two major ones can be singled out: the Government of Sudan 
(GoS), based in the northern part of the country on the one hand and the SPLM/A mostly based in 
southern Sudan on the other (refer to map of Sudan above for details on the geographical 
demarcation of the country).  
To better understand the nature of conflict in Sudan we may categorise it in one of the types of 
internal conflicts discussed by Oliver Furley. He identifies five types of domestic political conflicts: 
1. Elite Conflicts. These are said to be between old guard politicians and younger technocrats; 
between ideologists and bureaucrats and between party functionaries and civil servants. The 
objective, in such cases is to alter the uses of state power.49 
2. Factional conflicts. These can be organised by elites but reach down to a variety of social 
groups involving regional and ethnic inequalities, where mobilisation in the conflict may be 
based on appeals to ethnicity or class.50 
3. Communal conflicts. These are said to involve a threat to the state by a subgroup, which as a 
secessionist movement or civil war, often involves external support, or it may transform 
itself into a guerrilla struggle or even alternate between periods of violence and political 
negotiation. From the history of Sudan above, it is clear that the conflict in the country falls 
into this category. The subgroup in the case of Sudan can be assumed to be the SPLM/A 
which declared war on the state, in this case the government of Sudan. 
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4. Mass conflicts. These are those conflicts where political movements call for a complete 
revolution and change in the power structure. These are rare and have only occurred so far 
in Africa, as in the Ethiopian revolution of 1974.51 
5. Conflicts against existing patronage networks. Here, political protest are made against existing 
networks of patronage that exclude large numbers among whom resentment results in 
combining together to confront the regime, often with outbreaks of violence.52 
Having categorised the conflict in Sudan as a communal one, then we might as well go 
further and situate the warring parties in two categories mentioned. The government in the north on 
the one hand, championing the idea of a Sudan unified under Islamic sharia law (for instance), and 
the SPLM/A as a ‘secessionist’ movement revolting against the governments ideals and instead 
forging for the notion of a ‘new Sudan’ free from racism and ethnicity among other freedoms, on 
the other hand. Here, we have two parties within a state that are seen to be pursuing incompatible 
goals, hence conflict, specifically a communal (or civil) conflict.  
Conflicts, depending on their types can either be short or last long. The latter is the case of 
Sudan. For a conflict to end several factors must converge. Wallesteen points out seven distinct ways 
in which parties can resolve their incompatibilities:  
1. A party may change its goals - that is, shift its priorities. The chances of this happening are very 
dismal since most parties hold strong to their beliefs and priorities. This was the case in Sudan 
especially in the immediate aftermath of independence and many years after when northern and 
southern elite could not reach an agreement on resolving the ideological and developmental 
differences in the country. However, a party can display a shift in what it gives highest priority to 
and this may open way in which the other side can reciprocate.53 
2. The parties stick to their goals but find a middle point at which resources can be divided or 
shared. Dominant perceptions refer to this as the main form of compromise but as Wallesteen 
indicates, it is only one form of compromise. The essence is not that parties surrender their 
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goals and priorities but that they meet at a point of symbolic meaning to all of them.54 Here 
caution needs to be taken so that no part feels left out or having taken a raw deal. It is important 
therefore that change by one side (say change by the government of Sudan) be coupled to 
change by the other side (say change by the SPLM/A). 
3. Horse-trading. This involves meeting the demands of one party on one or more issues, while 
fulfilling those priorities of the other party on other issues. In horse-trading, for instance when it 
comes to matters of territory, the idea would be that one party, A, (take for instance GoS) takes 
area 1, (for example Omdurman, presently part of northern Sudan) and the other party, B, (for 
instance the GoSS) takes area 2, (for instance Juba, presently part of southern Sudan) although 
both of them have had demands on both areas. This can also be seen as a form of compromise 
but doesn’t involve division as discussed above.55 
4. Shared Control. A territory can be shared by being ruled as a condominium, where decisions 
require the consent of both parties.56 A good example is the case of colonial Sudan where the 
British and Egyptians signed a condominium agreement in 1899 to share the governance of 
Sudan. As will be discussed later, features of this can also be seen in post-CPA Sudan where 
GoS is basically sharing the governance of the country with a SPLM. 
5. Leaving control to an outside party. This means externalising control so that the warring parties 
agree not to rule the resources themselves.57 This can be seen in light of former protectorates 
where colonial powers took over control of certain territories as protectorates. An example of 
this in the early period of colonisation would be Uganda which was considered a British 
protectorate. In recent years, the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina is also mentioned where in 
1999 part of its territory-Kosovo was placed under international protection. This meant that 
neither the Yugoslav authorities nor the Kosovo Albanian representatives run the area; instead 
authority resided with the United Nations (UN) Commissioner for a given time.58 
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6. Possibility of resorting to conflict resolution mechanism, notably arbitration or other legal 
procedures that the parties can accept. This entails finding a procedure that can resolve the 
conflict according to some of the previously mentioned five ways, with the added quality that it 
is done through a process outside the parties: immediate control.59 
7. Leave issues for later or to oblivion. The reasoning behind this argument is that some issues may 
gain from being delayed as their significance may pale or their symbolic characters may be 
reduced.60 This strategy is also meant to avoid rushing to find solutions to all problems at the 
same but to give time to ponder ways forward for certain problems. What must be considered 
here is that there should be a second chance to bring up and tackle such issues and not to 
entirely throw them under the carpet. 
Most of these aspects can be seen in one form or another when it comes to the Sudanese 
conflict resolution process which boiled down to the signing of the CPA.  
Firstly, the agreement reached by Gos and SPLAM/A in 2005 was due to the fact that both parties 
reached, without surrendering all their goals, a middle ground and met halfway to agree to end the 
conflict in a peaceful manner this time. Signature of the CPA was a sign of both parties reaffirming 
and consolidating their commitment to what they had agreed upon. 
Aspects of ‘horse-riding’ on a general level can also be observed in the fact that the northern part of 
the territory was put under the government of Sudan while the southern part under the SPLM/A 
which later formed the government of southern Sudan. 
Shared control here is seen in the way that the CPA provided for a means of power- and wealth 
sharing between the contracting parties. 
Therefore, the act of signing the CPA can be referred to as a quintessential component of peace 
resolution, a concept this paper uses as an entry point to exploring reintegration of former child 
soldiers. 
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Wallesteen defines conflict resolution as ‘a social situation where the armed conflicting 
parties in a (voluntary) agreement resolve to peacefully live with-and/or dissolve-their basic 
incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against each other.’61  
Johan Galtung refers to conflict resolution as a process that leads the action-system to a state where 
the system no longer has two or more incompatible goal-states. If we choose to understand conflict 
resolution as a process geared towards peaceful living then we might as well agree with Druckman and 
Diehl in equating conflict resolution to post-conflict peace reconstruction.  
To them, post-conflict peace building is an inclusive term that involves efforts not only to maintain 
order but also, after a settlement is implemented, to increase cooperation among the parties to a 
conflict and to deepen their relationship by addressing the conditions that led to the dispute, 
fostering positive attitudes and allaying distrust, and building or strengthening common institutions 
and processes through which the parties interact.62  
It is at this stage of conflict resolution/peace building that I believe reintegration should be located 
and which I situate the issue of reintegration of former Sudanese child soldiers in this paper.  
A diagram is used to further elaborate on the characteristic features of this stage of conflict. 
The figure below depicts the full life cycle of a typical conflict and the level that conflict resolution 
occupies. Assuming that the conflict in Sudan underwent the periods of conflict indicated in this 
cycle, and that one process, in no particular order led to the development of the other, then we end 
up with a stage at the bottom left-hand side of the diagram, referred to as peace resolution or post-
conflict peace building characterised by the signing of the CPA. In understanding this stage as part 
of a process of a large process of conflict resolution, we may divide and locate two different phases 
characteristic of the signing of the CPA as follows; 1) peace enforcement or conflict mitigation - 
illustrated by the fact that the CPA provided for a cease fire and opened up space for dialogue; and 
2) peace keeping or conflict termination - indicated by the very fact that it ended the long civil war 
between the South and the North and made provisions for among other things, power-sharing and 
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wealth-sharing which qualify it as a form of settlement, a typical  and vital characteristic/component 
of this phase of conflict.  
In opting to locate reintegration at the post-conflict, peace building phase, I am not 
assuming that there is absolutely no conflict at this stage, as is evident in Sudan, there is still conflict 
in the country. As a matter of fact, ‘all these levels (of peace and conflict, indicated on the right-
hand, vertical axis of the diagram) involve some degree of conflict, but with significantly different 
levels of hostility, including violence’63. For this reason, each level, including that of conflict 
resolution, should be understood as referring to a sequence of goals each applicable to the conflict.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Life History of a Conflict. Adopted from Druckman D. and Diehl F. P, Conflict Resolution, Vol. 
II (London, California and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006), P.11.64 
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In examining conflict, it is important to recognise that conflict resolution is that thin line 
between a narrow concept of peace (no war) and a very broad one (justice) as pointed out by 
Wallensteen. Therefore, conflict resolution should not be confused with conflict solution particularly 
in light of the conflict in Sudan. Galtung points out that what is characteristic of a ‘solution’ is that 
there is no more incompatibility. Literally speaking, this may be prima facie the perception of some in 
the outside world (those not familiar with Sudan), but it is not the case in Sudan. The (two) parties 
to the conflict reached a compromise but did not get rid of their incompatibilities. Optimistically, we 
may hope that the CPA, if well executed might, by intent or accident lead to a solution to the 
conflict in Sudan. The hope for a solution is nonetheless thinned by the fact that many controversial 
issues remain pending and the problem of Darfur is not yet resolved.  
Even though conflict resolution is not the same as complete disarmament, it is probable that 
peace agreements (like that of Sudan) will only be durable if they result in some disarmament (like 
those exercises undertaken in the aftermath of the signing of the CPA to disarm and demobilise 
soldiers including child soldiers from armed zones and which are still underway), as well as changes 
in all security sectors aimed towards transparency, integrity and professionalism that includes 
safeguarding of human rights.65 Particularly, disarmament and demobilisation need to be joined with 
reintegration and rehabilitation of soldiers, not least, child soldiers.  
Imperative to post-conflict peace building is that all efforts are channelled towards maintenance of 
peace and preventive measure taken to remedy the situation from sliding back to “active-conflict.” 
Reintegration and rehabilitation of former child soldiers is an imperative process at this stage. The 
reintegration of such children ensures that children are protected from participating in conflict, that 
they are slowly weaned to the norms of their respective societies and that they are provided with 
security by their families and government. Failure to successfully reintegrate such children, I argue 
and outline, in the coming chapters, upsets peace and creates insecurity as they are used to cause 
mayhem in society. For example, in Sudan, villages and warring communities use these children to 
raid and loot from neighbouring communities.  
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Even though disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes have become 
central efforts of peace building in post-CPA Sudan both by government and national and 
international organisations, these efforts have been marred with challenges that have largely stalled 
them.  
In the few areas where the processes are still underway, progress is modicum and former child 
soldiers remain in Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs) centres for a long time that some of them 
are re-recruited by armed groups in Darfur and neighbouring countries. 
The effort of this thesis is to examine the process of reintegration of former child soldiers back into 
society and question why this process has so far not bore the fruits it intended in Sudan since 2005. 
2.1.2 Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) 
DDR is a set of terms used by organisations and most post-conflict governments to refer to 
activities that involve programmes to help with the rehabilitation of ‘ex-combatants’ after the 
termination of a war or conflict. In this thesis, the terms will be used and understood in the context 
of disarming, demobilising and reintegrating former child soldiers. 
1) Disarmament refers to the process of collecting small arms and light and heavy weapons within a 
conflict zone. It basically entails the collection of weapons, assembly of combatants and 
development of arms management programs, including their safe storage and sometimes their 
destruction. Disarmament is however not a prerequisite of demobilisation of children from armed 
forces and conflict zones since most of them do not carry their own weapons. In casu to Sudan, 
child soldiers are easily identified as they mostly carry their weapons with them and it is easier then 
to trace the barracks’ that they’re associated with. In the immediate aftermath of the war, it was 
common to see civilians, including children with guns. In that case, disarmament could be seen as 
a prerequisite to demobilisation or a condition that may necessitate (even though it may not 
necessarily lead to) demobilisation. 
2) Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of soldiers from the army or from an 
armed group. This is common after the signing of a peace agreement as in the case of Sudan. 
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During the demobilisation of children, basic information of their participation in armed conflict is 
collected in order to establish their level of participation. Personal information is also collected in 
order to determine the child’s identity which will help in family tracing. 
  Demobilisation can also be informal. Informal demobilisation occurs when child soldiers 
escape from armed forces/groups or are released by their armed groups spontaneously or randomly as 
a result of advocacy pressures or other circumstances. The fact that southern Sudan passed a law that 
criminalised the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict (in the Child bill 2008)66; most 
commanders randomly release children from military barracks fearing criminal charges. As a result, 
such children do not get to be formally registered and are excluded in reintegration programmes-a 
factor that has dealt a hard blow to the reintegration of child soldiers in Sudan.67 Informal occasions of 
demobilisation also include gaining the agreement of a particular armed group to release child soldiers 
during an ongoing conflict which has proved difficult in most conflicts68 
3) Reintegration encompasses a long-term process that aims to give children a viable alternative to 
their involvement in armed conflict and help them resume life in the community. Elements of 
reintegration include family reunification (or finding alternative care if reunification is impossible), 
providing education and training, devising appropriate strategies for economic and livelihood 
support and in some cases providing psycho-social support. Psycho-social support include 
programmes that are devised to psychologically help the child come to grips with the realities of 
conflict and its aftermath, as well as help him/her become a social human being able to interact 
‘normally’ with others and rejoin the community. What we may ask here then is what constitutes 
successful reintegration?  
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  There are no specific laid down components to successful reintegration since each child 
soldier’s experience is different and communal contexts after demobilisation vary from one country or 
society (society here referring to the people in a country) to the other. However, experience has shown 
that there are some fundamental indicators of successful reintegration, these include, inter alia;  
a) Family reunification and acceptance as part of the family and larger community. 
b) Effective psycho-social support. 
c) Having appropriate opportunities for education and/training and a strategic source of 
livelihood. 
Some human rights experts69 categorise, and rightly so, such processes as psycho-social support 
as falling into a large framework of rehabilitation, which the child must undergo before they can 
be socially reintegrated back into societies.  
Where as while in combat child soldiers can loot to survive, in ‘normal life’ they cannot loot with 
impunity. In a country like Sudan which is wallowing in poverty with high unemployment rates, 
where a large percentage of its population struggles to obtain the basics for survival, can we still 
talk of reintegration? Former child soldiers wonder, reintegration to what? To normal life where 
they might only face rejection, unemployment, lack of food, shelter and other basic needs? 
These factors complicate the issue of reintegration and call for thorough examination of the 
issue as well as a pragmatic approach to tackling the issue. 
2.2 Hypothesis  
 In trying to understand the genesis of conflicts in post-colonial Africa, scholars have resorted 
to analysing colonial attitudes and governance structures, and comparing those to the nature and 
state of the immediate post-colonial state in order to find out whether there is a dichotomy that 
largely contributes to what most of them refer to as ‘the crisis’ of most colonised states.70 From 
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various analyses of the colonial state, scholars have come up with overwhelming factors and theories 
that explain the crises that most post-colonial states face.  
This thesis maps out some of the arguments presented but is also careful to point out that not all 
‘crises’ experienced in post-colonial states are as a result of colonisation but that some of those 
originate from within these states. The underlying aim here is to emphasise the quandary of the 
Sudanese state, a formerly colonial state, when it comes to handling the issue of rehabilitation and 
reintegration of former child soldiers. 
A state in this sense being understood in Weberian terms as ‘a human community that (successfully) 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’71. 
 During the scramble for Africa, European powers partitioned territories without paying due 
regard to ethnic divisions in the continent. The colonial division of the continent was to make it 
easier for colonisers to manipulate the various peoples in order to ease governance. In the aftermath 
of African colonisation (around the period of 1960s) the Organisation of African Union (OAU) was 
concerned with this artificial partition of the continent but assumed that African nations would be 
more focussed on building their nations as one people and that ethnicity would not play a big role. 
This assumption was based on a rickety premise as today’s independent African states are ‘polyglot 
mixtures of cultural and linguistic groups’72 that have proved superficially difficult to integrate and 
unite the continent. 
 In terms of governance many observers note that colonial administrations used a system of 
governance that emulated that in their home countries. For example, the British used a system 
largely based on the Westminster system of administration which ignored the traditional power 
structures already existent in most African societies.  
In the case of Sudan, the condominium leadership relied heavily on civil leaders and on the police 
force making their administration militant and suppressive. After independence, (the period referred 
to here is that from the late 1950 to 1960s when most African countries regained their 
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independence) most African states based their institutions on more or less what had been created 
during colonisation. The need to review these structures or even to construct them a new, even 
though deemed imperative in those early years of independence was ignored. It was clear then that 
most independent states were mere replicas of the colonial state only with their national elites on the 
steering wheel. Why do I say this? Because when new African leaders took over power from colonial 
administrations, ‘they were confronted with the paradoxical situation of having to operate with 
newly conceived pluralist institutions of alien derivation (alien because they were not founded within 
the national/local state regime and were therefore not tailored to enhance democracy but 
supression) (including parties and parliaments), whereas the bulk of their own political 
understanding had been modelled in a centralised and authoritarian colonial context’73. Therefore, it 
was clear that ‘the formal agencies transferred to African hands were thus alien in derivation, 
functionally conceived, bureaucratically designed, authoritarian in nature, and primarily concerned 
with issues of domination rather than legitimacy’74.  
 Most measures taken to correct this misnomer incessantly failed as the wrong strategies and 
approaches were adopted. For instance, in Kenya the government resorted to enlarging government 
institutions like ministries in the façade that it would lead to shared responsibility and more ethnic 
representation when in reality, it was to ensure the government’s domination which would as a result 
increase the possibilities that it stayed in power.  Such maliciously calculated moves meant to benefit 
but a few, weakened state structures and made them futile. These weaknesses of states that began in 
the aftermath of independence largely created what is mostly referred to the “crisis of the African 
state.” This crisis, I believe, is at the crux of most conflicts in the continent. 
  In contributing to the scholarly debate on the nature of the state in Africa, I argue in this 
thesis that the child soldier phenomenon in the continent and specifically in Sudan is better 
understood not only in the context of the crisis of the post-colonial state but the crisis of a post-
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conflict state as well. Here I mean that the post-colonial state in Africa is at cross-roads and that a 
post-colonial, post-conflict state like Sudan is at the epicentre of this crisis. 
Evidence of this crisis can be observed in the brief history of Sudan above. We notice constant 
failure of successive governments in the post-colonial period to stop the divisions that were taking 
place then between the North and the South and among the Sudanese people. This systemic failure 
led to en masse dissatisfaction, in the country as a whole, which certainly culminated into revolts that 
led to the outbreak of the civil war in the 1980s.  
 These features are not only characteristic to Sudan but common to post-colonial African 
states.  
In analysing the reintegration of  child soldiers in Sudan therefore, the aim of this thesis is manifold; 
to show the complexity of the issue and the challenges facing it that would help in understanding 
why reintegration is continually failing; and to show the crisis of the post-colonial, post-conflict 
African state –a crisis that often manifests in ethnic conflicts over power and access to resources 
which inevitably ‘leads to the proliferation of child soldiers not only because of the prevalence of 
civil conflicts (like that in Sudan) but also in failing to bolster education and employment 
opportunities for young people’, in such cases ‘children are rendered particularly vulnerable to 
recruitment by rebel movements and offered comparable opportunity, protection and gains by being 
members of armed groups’75. 
 The period after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, is one that put an 
extreme amount of pressure on the government of Sudan; it saw the temporary division of the 
country into south and north; a coalition government that had to share resources and a country that 
had to rebuild its infrastructure a new and ensure that peace is maintained. As a result, the post-CPA 
Sudan is a state with diverse priorities. In trying to find its place, the government is in many 
instances, “lost” in what I call a priority-crisis, which tends to favour infrastructural development to 
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issues of human rights and child rights hence largely contributing to the failure of reintegration of 
former child soldiers.  
 The fact that Darfur (an area in western Sudan, refer to map of Sudan above) is still in 
conflict deals a bigger blow to Sudan and exerts more pressure to the “young” government as it has 
to mobilise resources to help stop the fighting in the area. The fact that the government is caught up 
in the conflict adds to the state-crisis. These factors largely divert the government’s focus on more 
significant issues of peace building such as reintegration of former child soldiers. In shoving this 
problem to the side, as shall be outlined in the coming chapters, the government will have an even 
bigger problem to deal with in future as such children get involved in irregular vigilante groups,  are 
involved in raiding villages, stealing and a host of other vices. They also constitute a large percentage 
of juvenile delinquents in the country.  
Yet the worst effect of this neglect in Sudan is seen in the way that ex-child soldiers are being re-
recruited by irregular armed groups in Darfur, Chad and in northern Uganda by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) where active conflict pursues.  
Given the factors above, the reintegration of former child soldiers, its progress, challenges 
and mostly setbacks can better be understood through the lens of the crisis of post-colonial, post-
conflict and even post-CPA Sudanese state.  
This paper seeks to use this argument as a framework for analysing the reintegration phenomenon. 
This kind of premise also begs the question how can the government of Sudan best deal with the 
reintegration issue? I argue that given the widespread involvement of children in the war in Sudan 
and the limited capacity of the government, both in financial resources and child rights experience, 
reintegration of children becomes a global problem/issue. In not excusing the state for failing to 
realise successful reintegration of children, it is clear that the yoke of reintegration needs to be 
shared with other national, regional and international organisations (which largely comprise the 
international community) that have experience in dealing with the same in other parts of the 
continent and the world at large. Thus I will also take a global approach and examine the vitality of 
the role played by international organisations in Sudan when it comes to reintegration. 
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2.3 Methodological scope 
This research is largely based on analysis of data, from first hand official and non-official 
documents. A number of primary sources are used e.g. the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 
Sudan, the Constitution of Sudan as well as a host of other government documents. International 
legal instruments like the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Geneva Conventions 
etc, which Sudan is a signatory to, are also used in the analysis. 
Vital to this research are also reports of national and international organisations working in Sudan, 
media reports and articles on the situation of child soldiers, magazines, online news sites and many 
other relevant materials. The bulk of the work will be composed of an analysis of data drawn from 
secondary sources namely relevant books, journals and academic papers.  
My experience, having lived and worked in Sudan adds to the ‘credibility’ of the information given in 
the following chapters when it comes to accounting for certain cultural practices, daily lives of the 
people in the country and generally the situation of children particularly that of child soldiers in the 
country.  
 The periodisation used here is that starting from 2005, the time of the signing of the CPA to 
2010 when the first ‘democratic’ general elections were held in post-conflict or post-CPA Sudan and 
a year before the much-awaited Sudanese referendum (in 2010) where the South will have the 
chance to decide on self-determination as espoused in the CPA. 
For pragmatic reasons, interviews were not conducted as part of information gathering. 
Nevertheless, this hiatus has been catered for by the use of information obtained form different 
biographies of former child soldiers and ‘credible’ documents produced by local, national and 
international organisations working in Sudan and which have conducted interviews with child 
soldiers and former child soldiers. Only a number, relevant to this thesis will be used. 
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2.3.1 Definition of the Research Question 
 Sudan’s history is one dogged by conflicts, civil wars, fought on many fronts with diverse 
impetuses. The hardest of these was that which started in the early 1980s and was only brought to an 
end in 2005 by the signing of the CPA.  
The body of research on the political makeup of Sudan, its economic, social and even cultural 
orientations is burgeoning. The conflict in the country has also been relatively well covered in the 
last years. Generally, the human rights situation in the country has left a lot to be desired although 
observers have attributed this to it being engulfed in conflict for a long period of time and hope that 
the situation will change so long as peace is maintained. 
Children’s rights have been of concerned to the nation given that a significant proportion of its 
population are children. It is estimated that 40 per cent out of its total population (which is 
estimated at 42 million) are children below the age of 14.76 
 The exploitation of children in the Sudanese conflict although alarming, has not received the 
attention it deserves. Most research on children, particularly on child soldiers mostly revolves around 
the need to bar their use in armed conflict. In cases where children have been involved in armed 
conflict, research has emphasised their disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration back into 
society (the communities where these children belong) without sometimes delving deeper into what 
really constitutes these processes in reality. The questions of how children get enlisted into armed 
forces and groups and why they decide to take up arms have also been relatively well covered.77 
However, only a modest number of researches have tackled reintegration save for none delving 
deeper into the nitty-gritty of the phenomenon. As a matter of fact, no research has questioned why 
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reintegration processes are stalling. Even when they are deemed to be happening, children are 
sometimes rejected by their families for different reasons; others are considered outcasts by their 
communities and left for dead while those who are happily ‘reintegrated’ seem to be lacking a source 
of livelihood.  
 In an attempt to cover this lacuna, this research aspires to answer the question why the 
reintegration of child soldiers is failing. Failing is hereby meant by not producing the intended 
results. The claim that reintegration is failing naturally begs the question, is there a situation where 
reintegration is perceived to be succeeding and what does it encompass. This question has also not 
been fully addressed in the existing literature although several attempts have been made to this 
effect.  
Among fundamental factors brought forward as components of “successful” are; family 
reunification and acceptance of a former child soldier as part of the family and larger community, 
former child soldiers undergoing some sort of psycho-social support which is perceived to be 
effective by an accredited psychologist and/or social worker, and that a former child soldier has an 
appropriate opportunity for education and/training and a strategic source of livelihood. It is rare to 
find cases where all these factors are present.  
 In taking Sudan as the object of research I intend to show that these factors are not the only 
ones that comprise ‘successful’ reintegration and that a situation where all these factors are present 
and complement each other in a former child soldiers life are almost impossible to find but should 
be the ultimate goal of reintegration. The failure to provide child soldiers with the opportunities that 
enable them rebuild their lives over again, is what this paper deems as the basis of failure of 
reintegration efforts in most post-conflict countries. It is with this premise that this thesis ponders 
the question, ‘why is reintegration failing in Sudan?’ Posing such a leading question, it is hoped it 
that the necessary insights that go a long way into covering the existing desideratum in research on 
child soldiers particularly when it comes to DDR will be provided. 
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2.3.2  Who is a Child Soldier?: The Problematic of Universal 
Definitions 
In examining the phenomenon of child soldiery in Sudan given the long period of conflict 
the country has been engulfed in, it is natural that many children are born and grow up in conflict.  
Conflict becomes then the only life they know. This fact makes it difficult to differentiate between a 
child and an adult as both groups suffered trauma in one way or the other while in combat. 
Defining a child from this perspective becomes a thorny issue. In fact, in the case of Sudan, it is 
normal that most child soldiers spend all their childhood in combat and most may no longer be 
‘children’ at the time of demobilisation: a point that complicates the scope of approach when it 
comes to the issue of reintegration.  
 This paper takes into account the controversy brought about by conflict particularly when it 
comes to reintegration where most persons, previously recruited into armed conflict as children are 
no longer children, i.e. under 18s at demobilisation and therefore at reintegration. However, it pays 
special regard to the status of children, their vulnerability, innocence and the uniqueness of their 
needs at demobilisation and eventual reintegration.  
For the purposes of scope, this paper limits its understanding of a child soldier to ‘any person under 
18 years of age who forms part of an armed force (or group) in any capacity, and those 
accompanying such groups, other than purely as family members, as well as girls recruited for sexual 
purposes and forced marriage’78.  
For a comprehensive understanding of child soldiery at the reintegration stage in the Sudanese 
context, a child soldier will be understood as ‘anyone younger than 18 (years old) who has 
participated in armed forces or groups – either on a volunteer basis or by coercion – directly or in a 
supporting function where participation includes fighting, guarding, cooking, or serving as a porter, 
messenger, spy or sex slave’79.  
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In taking the age of under 18, as the point of departure and therefore persons under that age 
as children, it is important to clarify the term, “child.”  
The term child basically refers to a young person, from the age of birth to the age of full physical 
development.80  
Common views characterise this stage as one of immaturity - lacking in mental and physical 
development. Nevertheless, it is important to note that childhood also encompasses a stage of 
tumultuous changes especially at adolescence. As a matter of fact, ‘adolescence is a time of 
vulnerability with the uncertainties and turbulence of physical, mental and emotional development’81. 
These features additionally make children under 18 years old vulnerable. For example, this is a 
period when most girl child soldiers are sexually exploited.  
Additionally the period of childhood is calibrated with age sets and age groups which play a 
significant role in defining the actions of children at the different stages of development. Bennet 
points out that age grades (social divisions of a physical process of development) and age sets (social 
groupings with various characteristics of a corporate entity) are two institutions that have a direct 
bearing on the use of children in armed conflict since they both function to coopt young people to 
the service of society.82 Socially, he adds, age grades are commonly divided into three- child, junior 
and elder.83 The child-grade is basically characterised by immaturity, physically and mentally while 
the elder-grade is generally perceived as the norm-setting age to which all children should be 
educated. The junior grade, which this paper is more concerned with, is a hazy one. According to 
Bennet, ‘people at this grade can no longer be treated as children but they still lack the maturity of 
adults’84. 
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 This view of a certain group of children as somewhat children but not adults varies from 
community to community and makes it difficult to pin down a particular age, universally, at which a 
child is considered an adult. 
Therefore, in taking a straight 18 approach85, it is not to say that I believe that all persons in 
the world under 18 years, Sudan included, are children! No. In fact in most communities in Africa 
adulthood comes earlier than 18 years of age.  
Among the Maasai of Kenya, for example, boys are taken from their communities to be taught to be 
morans (worriors) between the ages of 14 and 18. During this period, a boy undergoes various 
initiations rites de passage after which he is considered an adult and granted certain privileges like 
the right to marry. The important fact here is that adulthood can either come at the ages of 14, 15, 
16, 17 or 18 depending on how fast the set of Morans get acculturated to the initiation rites.  
In Sudan, among certain sub-tribes of the Dinka86, initiation ceremonies (gar) which involve scarring 
of the forehead are done on boys between the ages of 14 and 18.  
 On the contrary, there are many communities in Africa that regard persons of 20 years and 
over as children, for example, if one is still dependant on their parents or guardians even at the age 
of 30 they will be considered children. This perception applies mostly to boys than it does to girls. 
The Nuer87 of southern Sudan for example, rank their men into two groups - adults or non-adults. 
The deciding factor being initiation after which one is considered an adult but without which, one 
remains a non-adult.  
 For these reasons, it is difficult to wholly embrace an age, in this case under 18 as a universal 
definition for children.  
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All these factors considered, rather than use the straight 18 approach to emphasise its universality, I 
use it to emphasise the complexity of espousing such a definition across-the-board. 
The under 18 approach is also limiting when it comes to examining reintegration in Sudan as the 
conflict in the country lasted a long time and most children, recruited under the age of 18, say age 7, 
are no longer children at demobilisation more than say, 20 years after their recruitment.  
These group of persons, even though “adults” when the war ended, were recruited as children, and 
fought as child soldiers and were just as traumatised as other child soldiers today. It might be in fact 
that they more than anyone need more help to be rehabilitated and reintegrated back into society 
once demobilised.  
 The issues surrounding child soldiery are multi-faceted and require in depth analyses. 
However that is beyond the mandate of this paper which limits its scope, for reasons explored above 
and to necessitate thorough scrutiny, to persons under the age of 18 at demobilisation and 
consequently, reintegration. The age of under 18 also emphasises the vulnerability of children and 
needs that are only special to them. 
 At reintegration, it is hoped that helpful measures directed to child soldiers will help them salvage 
their lives if not their childhood. 
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Chapter 3: The Child Soldier Phenomenon and the Sudanese 
Context 
3.1 The Child soldier Phenomenon 
Children have been used in war since time immemorial.88 Writings about boy soldiers in the 
aftermath of the American civil war (of 1774) indicate the involvement of children. In fact at the end 
of that war, the nobility and sacrifice of the young boys who participated in battle was celebrated. 
David Rosen writes that, ‘boy soldiers who survived intact were respected citizens whose 
contribution to civic life was enhanced by their experience of war.’89  
Singer acknowledges the involvement of children in early times but emphasises on the limited role 
they played. He argues that when children served in ancient armies such as the enrolment of Spartan 
boys into military training, at ages seven to nine, they typically did not serve in combat. Instead, he 
adds, they carried out more menial chores, such as herding cattle or bearing shields and mats for 
more senior warriors.90  
The arming of the Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth) when Allied armies entered Nazi Germany in 
the spring of 1945 also stands out as one of the instances when children fought at the frontline of 
battle with their adult counterparts. Singer however point outs that that ‘was a desperate gambit to 
hold off the invasion until new “miracle” weapons (like the V-2 rocket and the Me-262 jet fighter) 
could turn the tide.’91  
An argument that I find feeble as it provides a leeway for the enlistment of children under the 
pretences of keeping them as reserves or having them not participate in combat. More often than 
not, armed rebel commanders who recruit children into their forces have claimed that it was out of 
need for manpower or that these children only carried out ‘menial’ tasks. In fact, Museveni’s 
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National Resistance Army (NRA) fighting in Uganda in the 1980s claimed ‘humane’ grounds for 
having children in the group. The group claimed that most of the NRA children were orphaned, 
displaced or unaccompanied and that they were taken in so that they would get food and protection. 
Whether this was the case or not, one cannot be sure.  
Such claims, even in the context of warfare in earlier times, mask the cruelty that these children went 
through during war. The fact that in those days children who participated in conflict were 
considered heroes and nobles, presents us with a different side of children’s involvement in conflict 
as that given in contemporary humanitarian accounts. 
 Rosen reminds us that that in actuality, the present views about childhood as innocence and 
as a protected state only emerged in Europe during the middle ages and that before that, an attitude 
of indifference (as can be understood from the examples above) towards children prevailed.92 The 
genesis of human rights and human rights awareness may have different roots but it has certainly, 
largely contributed to highlighting the involvement of children in armed conflict world wide. It is 
clear from media- and international human rights reports that the phenomenon has greatly increased 
since the end of the cold war. This increase has been attributed to; 
 The changing nature of warfare. That recent wars are intra-state and largely target civilians. 
Situations of conflict in contemporary times create security vacuums that feature an increase in 
transnational organised crime. Traditional wars, it is argued, were self-limiting, rule-bound in a 
number of ways: politically-in having clear political objectives; temporally-in having well-defined 
beginnings and ends that resulted in victory or defeat; spatially-in the existence of geographically 
bounded battlefields; humanely-in that they were fought according to a set of commonly accepted 
rules that among other things, clearly distinguished between civilians and combatants.93 
 The availability of small arms and their proliferation with nation states. The premise here 
is that arms technology has advanced thus making weapons light to carry and easy to use even by 
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small girls and boys. The fact that certain weapons are automatic means that less training is required 
before use hence encouraging participation of children in conflict. Weapons commonly used include 
the AK-47 and M-16 assault riffles. Opponents of this argument point out that the most popular 
weapons used by child soldiers today such as the Kalashnikov assault riffle and the AK-47, have 
been available since 1949 and were the main riffles used by national liberation groups and insurgents 
long before the child soldier crisis hence availability and lightweight features cannot be the only 
factors encouraging child soldier use.94  
This is a valid point; however, it is important to point out that more and more civilians today, are 
getting hold of assault riffles as protective weapons. One reason for this is the failure of state 
authorities to protect civilians in times of conflicts hence civilians are ‘forced’ to take up arms for 
their own protection. 
 Vulnerability and innocence of children. Most armed groups recruit children due to the fact 
that they are vulnerable and easy to manipulate. Various reports on child soldier use point out the 
fact that many commanders prefer children as they are easy to manipulate and follow orders with 
least resistance thus easily turning them into “killing machines”95.  
Despite the validity of these arguments, the context of conflict varies from one region to the other 
and so do reasons for the enlistment or conscription of children into armed forces/groups. 
Let us examine the reasons that drew children into conflict in Sudan. 
3.2 The Jenajesh96 of Sudan 
Thousands of child soldiers are said to have been recruited and used by armed forces, 
government backed militias and armed opposition groups in Sudan. The exact number of these 
children is not known as only a small percentage was formally released in the aftermath of the 
signing of the CPA. Some were randomly released as armed groups feared being criminalised or to 
be seen to have used children, such children were not included in formal DDR programmes.  
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In 2003, Amnesty International reported forced recruitment of children as child soldiers mostly by 
southern militias allied to the Government of Sudan. Such recruitment was said to mostly have been 
around the Bentiu area (Bentiu is the capital of Unity State, geographically part of southern Sudan-
refer to map). Further reports by the organisation state that youths were picked up in Khartoum for 
apparent recruitment into armed forces without any opportunity to notify their families.97 As recent 
as 2009, reports from the United Nations (UN) confirmed recruitment and use of 101 children by 
the SPLA but could not give a conclusive figure as registration exercises were still underway.98 
3.2.1 Why and How they got Enlisted into Armed Forces and/or 
Armed Groups 
The fact that the war in Sudan lasted so long means that most children were born during 
warfare and lived through it. Thus, war became the normality, the only situation they knew and 
which comprised a large part of their lives. As a result of this, schools were closed down, family ties 
broken as fathers and sometimes mothers had to join in and fight leaving their children with a 
responsible relative or sometimes in the custody of an elderly child, poverty levels increased and 
seeds of bitterness sowed amongst opponents. 
The existence of warfare meant that the traditional family structure was broken and parents 
were no longer bread winners but sometimes children, particularly older children who were left 
behind and had to take care of their younger siblings. Sometimes their only choice was to join armed 
groups that looted food from gardens and homes of others for their survival in the “bush” (in 
combat). This is how some boy soldiers ended up in armed conflict.  
Crops and animals comprised the bases of livelihood for many families, pillaging of the same 
by armed groups, meant that most families had nothing to eat, sell or barter hence poverty levels 
rose. For those who were already poor, or those with big families typical of Sudanese peoples, this 
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meant that food reserves were quickly exhausted. Economic decline, exacerbated by war increased 
poverty levels pushing adults and children alike into war.  
Such a situation was not particular to Sudan as it is a common occurrence in armed conflict. For 
instance, Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) is said to have had large numbers of orphans 
and unaccompanied children who simply ‘tagged along’ for food, protection and survival.99  
The situation in Sudan for the SPLA wasn’t any different. 
Forced recruitment. This entails the threat or actual violation of the physical integrity of the 
youth or someone close to him or her.100 The long period of war in Sudan meant that combatants 
from both sides were killed and slowly armed groups ran out of manpower. This shortage led them 
to recruit ‘strong’ young boys into their groups. These boys were trained and slowly but surely 
became part of these armed groups. 
In the North, Khartoum government forces were reported to have kidnapped child soldiers in 
schools and homes and delivered them for training.101 
Most girl soldiers, who joined armed forces, had been abducted to be used as wives and cooks in the 
camps while others actually fought in the war.  
The limited number of girls compared to boys in Sudan can be attributed to the fact that most girls 
found deserted or wondering around in search of food or shelter were abducted and kept as adopted 
daughters by some families with the hope that they would one day get married and fetch them (the 
families that abducted them) bride price. They were therefore abducted and kept (to the extent that 
one could talk about them having been protected) for their value as objects of wealth acquisition.  
Coercive or abusive recruitment. This refers to situations where there is no proof of direct 
physical threat or intimidation, but the evidence supports the inference of involuntary enlistment. 
For instance at the onset of one of the most tragic of all Sudanese civil wars - between the late 1980s 
and 1992 some 12,500 Sudanese boys wandered across two thousand kilometres of desert, thick 
forests and swamps between Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya.  
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Humanitarian workers speculated that they had been removed from their families at very tender ages 
by SPLA rebels trying to ensure a future supply of fighters. The criterion for selection into this 
children’s militia was said by some reporters to be the presence of two molar teeth.102 
 Most of these children (who later came to be known as the lost boys of Sudan) were lured into 
fighting by promises of being taken to school in Ethiopia. On arrival they realised that educational 
facilities were limited or non-existent. So, in the name of education, these children were given 
military training and indoctrinated into being jenajesh (child fighters/soldiers). They belonged to the 
Jesh a mer (Red Army) while the adults belonged to the Jesh a suad (Black Army). They were taught 
how to shoot, to dismantle and put together a gun, to launch rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and 
to follow orders. They were trained to fight and to fight like soldiers for they belonged to Jesh a 
mer. Precisely; they were turned into “killing machines.” 
“Voluntary recruitment.” When parents, siblings, or other family members are involved 
with/in the military, joining seems natural, particularly if this is combined with a ‘religious, ethnic or 
ideological element’103 to the family involvement.  
In northern Sudan, it is reported that apart from children being recruited from schools, family 
members played a big role in convincing them to join government forces. They were driven by the 
belief of fighting the abid (slaves) who were revolting against the government and by the fundament 
of finally making Islam the main religion in Sudan and Arabic (not English) the main language in the 
country. Theirs was not only a fight to eliminate the slave but one that would ensure a monotheistic 
state with Islam at its midpoint. 
In the South, most children joined SPLA, not just because they wanted to help their fathers 
and uncles but because they had seen their sisters raped; their mothers, fathers and other kin brutally 
murdered by northern allied- and armed forces and they wanted to avenge their deaths. In memoirs 
of a child soldier, “warchild,” Emmanuel Jal attests to the fact his joining the SPLA was just because 
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he wanted to help his father fight the Arabs and punish them for taking his mother away from him. 
But as the war continued matters got worse and he was filled with vengeance and hate. He writes: 
 
Slowly I forgot everything except my hatred for the Arabs. Night after night I’d listen to tales of 
mothers being raped, sisters taken, and villages destroyed, feeling my anger harden even more inside 
me. It felt like a spear twisting in my chest whenever I thought of the Jallabas (Arabs).104 
 
These reasons are not only common among child soldiers but adult soldiers from both warring 
groups. From his attestation, we notice feelings of helplessness, powerlessness and voicelessness 
which characterised the period he had not joined the army. In staying away and watching from a 
distance, he felt trapped and the only way to influence certain factors was by joining the armed 
group, which he did. Such feelings drive children to join armed conflict and may sometimes prima 
facie be seen as ‘voluntary.’ I believe it is because their choices are limited and feelings manipulated as 
they are only filled with bitterness towards the opponent. At such a young age it is difficult to 
control such strong feelings. 
Peer Pressure. The peer group that young people belong may be influential in pressurising 
members of the group to join armed forces. In Sudan, especially where child soldiers were viewed as 
heroes fighting for the protection of their land and religion (as was the case in the North) and 
fighting for liberation of their peoples (as in the South); others were easily influenced to join.  
This case is not sui generis to Sudan as cases of child soldiers all over the continent reveal this 
characteristic. For example Ugandan ex-girl child soldier, China Kaitetsi, reveals her excitement at 
joining the NRA was one with peer influences. She remembers;  
 “I was excited, because now I would be seeing the action that I had heard so much about from the older 
kids.”105 
Identity formation. Researchers have predicted that adolescents in certain circumstances 
forge their sense of identity on the basis of nationalist ideology.106 Although this has not been 
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proven in the case of Sudan, it could have played a big role in motivating children on both sides 
(especially those who joined northern forces) to get enlisted. 
With all these factors stated, it should be noted that there are international instruments that 
forbid the recruitment of children into armed forces and groups, most of which Sudan is a signatory 
to. There are also national legal instruments that the country has put in place to stop the recruitment 
and use of child soldiers. How effective they are and the commitment of the government of Sudan 
to realise the provisions of these instruments is another issue.  
We shall hereby examine those instruments in brief in order to try and get to the bottom of issues 
surrounding reintegration.  
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Chapter 4: Child Soldiery from a Legal Perspective 
4.1 International Humanitarian Law and the Child Soldier: The 
Scope of Application 
Most rules governing the conduct of states and warring factions have their basis in 
international law. States’ practices and international conference resolutions of such organisations as 
the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) evolve to acquire the status of 
customary international law which binds even those states that have not ratified or consented to 
certain international treaties. 
Most rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) are found in the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the two 1977 Additional Protocols (APs), as well as states’ practices and 
resolutions of International Conferences of the Red Cross. 
Article 3, common to all the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (henceforth, common article 3) 
extends a measure of protection to civilians. Common Article 3 of the fourth (IV) Geneva 
Convention extends these measures to armed conflicts of a non-international character. It states as 
follows;  
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the 
High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following 
provisions:  
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid 
 down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other 
 cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on 
 race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the 
 following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to 
 the above-mentioned persons:  
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
 torture;  
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(b) taking of hostages;  
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;  
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
 pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
 recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.107 
 
Here it is important to realise that children are protected as civilians and not as combatants as is the 
case of child soldiers. 
The Additional Protocols of 1977 tried to cater for this setback but succeeded to only put certain 
limitations on the freedom to recruit children; Article 77 (2) points out; 
The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they 
shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons 
who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen 
years the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.108 
 
As a whole there is no rule, either in the 1949 Geneva Conventions or the APs that explicitly 
prohibits the participation of children (those considered under the age of 18) in armed conflicts in 
their capacity as combatants. 
Additional Protocol (AP) II of the 1977 Geneva Convention is fundamental as it functions in 
situations of non-international armed conflicts. Of particular importance is Article 4 (3) (c) which 
states that;  
                                                 
107
 International Committee of the Red Cross, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Common Article 3 <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/380?OpenDocument> 
[accessed 16 July 2010]. 
108
 International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1977, Article 
77 (2) <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/470?OpenDocument> [accessed 16 July 2010]. 
 48 
‘Children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed 
forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities’109. 
From the wording of this article, it is clear that the burden of respect for the rules of war forbidding 
recruitment of children, largely lies with leaders of armed forces/groups who have the responsibility 
and choice to either recruit or not recruit children. This, ‘perhaps reflects the practical difficulties of 
regulating or controlling the self-willed activities of those under eighteen’110. 
Furthermore, the conventions discussed above, are limited in scope by the point that most 
of them anticipated conflict/s of international character and yet those being presently experienced 
are of non-international nature where mostly AP II would be operational but most states have not 
ratified it. The problem, then, as pointed out by Cohn et al., is that ‘Additional Protocol II is often 
unratified by the state in conflict, Common Article 3 places no limits on the recruitment or 
participation of children, the breaches of rules are committed by NGEs (Non-Governmental 
Entities), the level of strife is debatable, the application of human rights provisions is in doubt, and 
their reinforcement for various reasons, impossible’111.  
Different to other countries Sudan ratified the APs in mid 2006, a year after the signing of 
the CPA. Before that not much could be done as the country was in conflict and diplomatic issues 
were dormant and controversial. It could also be argued that the government was avoiding signature 
of such documents that would incapacitate it in various ways so as to lose ground in the war; for 
instance not to recruit under 18s would run mean risking having a shortage of military personnel. 
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4.2 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and Child 
Soldiers 
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is the most instrumental document 
when it comes to the rights and freedoms of children. It is one of the widely signed and ratified 
documents involving 193 parties and having been signed by 140 states as of July 2010.112 
Even though the CRC defines a child as every human being below the age of eighteen years,113 
article 38 maintains fifteen years as the age criterion for child soldier recruitment. It states; 
1. States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of international 
humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the 
child.  
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities.  
3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age 
of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have 
attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, 
States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.  
4. In accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law to 
protect the civilian population in armed conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible 
measures to ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an armed 
conflict.114 
 
The CRC basically builds on the APs I and II to come up with comprehensive provisions for 
children involved in armed conflict. While incorporating most of the provisions of Article 77 (2) of 
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AP I, article 38 reiterates in the provisions of article 4(3) of AP II albeit less progressively. It calls for 
action only when states take a ‘direct part in hostilities.’ 
Being a human rights instrument, the scope of application of the CRC is limited to only state actors 
meaning that non-state actors can basically get away with violations. This is contrary to International 
Humanitarian Law which applies to both categories of actors.  
In the case where a state has ratified both the CRC and the Additional Protocols (like that of Sudan), 
article 41 of the CRC ensures that no contradiction exists to diminish the protection that should be 
given to children. 
4.3 Optional Protocol on the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 
 The Optional Protocol was meant to correct the shortcomings of the CRC especially in its 
age definition, where the CRC’s article 1 terms a child as any person under the age of 18 while article 
38 (2) and (3) put the age limit of recruiting children into armed forces at 15.  
 Article 1 of the Optional Protocol, calls upon states to ensure that members of their armed 
forces who have not attained the age of 18 do not take a direct part in hostilities while Article 2 
forbids compulsory recruitment of under 18s. Article 3, raises the minimum age of voluntary 
recruitment from 15 as stated in the CRC to 18 and calls upon states to adhere to the standards set 
therein. 
 In my opinion, there is still a lot of ambiguity in the language of these conventions that 
provide a leeway for armed groups to enlist children. For example, that children should not take a 
direct part in conflict after being enlisted! It is difficult to control the activities of armed forces once 
one is enlisted, child or adult, they become soldiers and they are bound by the rules of the game. 
Moreover in cases of combat, such children, though 15 or under 18, must protect themselves even if 
it means using the weapons at their disposal.  
Precise and concise wording in these conventions would help clear up confusion and totally barn the 
use of child soldiers once and for all. 
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4.4 Legal Instruments in Sudan and Child soldiers 
4.4.1 Sudan and the CRC 
Sudan ratified the CRC in 1990 without reservations. Implementation of the CRC was 
however hindered by the presence of war in the country in the aftermath of its signature. 
4.4.2  The Interim Constitution of the Sudan and Child Soldiers 
 There is no explicit mention of children involved in armed conflict and how to assist them in 
the interim constitution. Instead there is a general clause lamping together the rights of children with 
those of women. Note 32 (5) of the interim constitution states; 
The State shall protect the rights of the child as provided in the international and regional 
conventions ratified by the Sudan.115 
In vowing to protect the rights of children, it can be assumed that the Sudanese state is in 
agreement with protecting children form enlistment into armed conflict. With this clause missing in 
the constitution however, it is difficult to hold the government responsible for its actions. 
Sudan has neither signed nor ratified the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
which was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), presently the African Union (AU, 
since 2001) in 1990 which came into force in 1999. However, it ratified the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights (ACHPRs) commonly known as the Banjul Charter, on 18 February 
1986116. 
Just like Sudan’s interim constitution, the Banjul Charter has no explicit mention on child rights but 
contains general individual rights which also apply to children. It also does not have specific 
mention to children involved in armed conflicts.117 
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4.4.3  Southern Sudan Child Act, 2008118 
 The landmark Child Act came into force on 13 October 2008 after being signed by the 
president of southern Sudan, making it the first ever children’s Act in southern Sudan. 
The Act was enacted for the purposes of promoting and protecting children’s rights in southern 
Sudan given that most laws have ignored children. Accordingly, it defines a child as any human 
being under the age of eighteen years and therefore a minor.  
Further, the Act prohibits the exposure of children to economic exploitation and child labour and 
mentions service of children with the police, prison or military among those prohibited. 
 Recruitment of children as stated in the Act encompasses compulsory, forced and voluntary 
recruitment into any kind of regular armed force or group. Particular to children and armed conflict, 
it gives 18 years as the minimum age for conscription or voluntary recruitment into armed forces or 
groups. Note 32 (2) (3) and (4) reiterate on the Government’s commitment to prevent recruitment 
and in cases where it has occurred to help reintegrate children into normal social life. It states: 
  (2) The Government shall ensure that no child shall be used or recruited to engage  
  in any  military or paramilitary activities, whether armed or un-armed, including,   
  but not limited to work as sentries, informants, agents or spies, cooks, in transport,  
  as labourers, for sexual purposes, or any other forms of work that do not serve the  
  interests of the child. 
   (3) The Government shall provide protection, rehabilitation, care, recovery and   
  reintegration into normal social life for children formerly associated with armed   
  conflict including children from regular and other armed groups and children   
  victims of armed conflict, having due regard to the special needs of girls and their   
  dependents. 
  (4) Where armed conflict occurs, the Government shall ensure that children’s   
  rights are protected in accordance with the provisions of this Act and international  
  humanitarian law.119 
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 Though the document does not delve deeper into specificities of how to reintegrate children, 
it recognises their involvement in armed conflict as “abnormal” and that of no involvement as 
“normal social life.” This point is imperative to this paper as it shows that the government of 
southern Sudan realises just how damaging involvement into armed conflict is. 
Even though it does not use to term ‘child soldiering’ we know from the definition above that 
involvement of children into armed conflict comprises child soldiering. 
 The Act becomes the first legal document to explicitly barn and criminalise the recruitment 
of children into armed forces and groups. To this effect it states:  
‘Any person involved in the recruitment of a child into an armed force or use of a child in any 
activity set forth above, commits an offence and shall upon conviction, be sentenced to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or with a fine or with both.’120 
The move by GoSS to enact such a document is plausible; the onus as has constantly been reiterated 
in this paper is not only to pass laws but to ensure that they are upheld, this is what will see the 
actual protection and fulfilment of children’s rights. 
4.4.4 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and Child Soldiers 
On the rights of children, the CPA states that: 
‘Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national 
or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his/her 
status as a minor.’121 
From this statement, it is clear that the CPA recognises a child as a minor and calls for his/her 
protection. Protection is an all-embracing word that put in context; we can say protection of 
children from involvement in armed conflict. 
On DDR, the CPA, just like the CRC views the overarching objective of the process as one 
aimed at contributing to an enabling environment to human security and to support post-peace-
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agreement social stabilisation across the Sudan, particularly in war-affected areas.122 To this effect, 
the CPA called for the demobilisation of all child soldiers within six months of its signature.123 The 
CPA also mandated the integration if all Other Armed Groups (OAGs) to either join the Sudanese 
government’s armed forces, namely the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or the SPLA by January 2006.124 
Although SAF denied recruitment and use of children in its ranks, it is reported that approximately 
19,000 soldiers were thought to have been under 18 during the integration exercise of 2006.125  
 According to the coalition to stop the use of child soldiers, the SPLA admitted that it had 
child soldiers in its ranks and made high-level commitments to end their recruitment and use. 
However, even as they gave their word, it was reported that 47 children were present in the Kilo 7 
barracks in Bentiu (unity state) in July 2006, and they were not released until July 2007.126 
UNICEF (the United Nations Children’s Fund) estimated that a total of 20,000 children from rebel 
forces in the southern Sudan were disarmed, demobilised and reunited (whether they were accepted 
and well reintegrated is not reported) with their families.127  
Despite that there were an estimated 2,000 children still associated with the SPLA, mainly in non-
combat roles in hard-to-reach areas (as per the UNICEF’s report of 2006).128  
 Under the CPA, the National Council for DDR was established in February 2006 and a 
DDR Commission for southern Sudan created in May 2006.129 Through this commission, field 
commanders continue to receive training on child protection (for example, one such training took 
place in 2007) which is said to have strengthened their commitment to demobilise children from 
armed forces. As a result of these efforts, a joint Military Committee Action Plan was established to 
address issues of abduction, rape and sexual violence especially in war-affected areas. It is also 
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mentioned that the commission facilitated the release of 25 children from SPLA bases in Bentiu (the 
capital of Unity State), southern Sudan and reunited them with their families in the north.130 
Why then is reintegration not working in Sudan notwithstanding all these efforts by government and 
non-governmental organisations? The following chapter of this thesis will delve deeper into the 
reintegration process of former child soldiers in Sudan and specifically ponder why the process is 
just not working or in the few cases where success has been realised it has only been modicum and 
not all-rounded. 
4.5 The erosion of Innocence: Child Soldiers as Criminals? 
 In international armed conflicts, children who participate in hostilities as combatants cannot 
be prosecuted when captured as they are protected as Prisoners-of-war (PoWs) by the Third Geneva 
Convention.  
Those who do not participate in combat are considered civilians and entitled to the protection 
granted by the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) and the API (1977) as well as human rights law. 
In reiteration, the protection accorded to children in non-international conflicts is enshrined in 
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, AP II and human rights law. 
 On the use of children in armed conflict, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (henceforth the “Rome Statute”) includes conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 
15 years or using them to participate actively in hostilities that are either of an international character 
(Art 8 (2) (b) (xxvi)) or that are non-international in nature (Art 8 (2) (e) (vii)) as war crimes.131  
This means that those adults who recruit children into hostilities should be held accountable for 
their actions. 
Whenever an apt link can be drawn, those adults found guilty  of  controlling soldiers including child 
soldiers can be prosecuted for the atrocities committed by those soldiers. This is known as the 
doctrine of command responsibility. 
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 While there are clearly set out rules to try adults who command their subordinates to commit 
atrocities, one wonders what happens to children who voluntarily join armed forces and commit 
atrocities without being forced? 
 In the event of an international conflict, both protocols additional to the Geneva 
Conventions prohibit the imposition of the death penalty for children under 18 at the time an 
offence is committed. On the other hand, as observed in several conflicts worldwide like that in 
Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sri Lanka, children have been perpetrators of many crass atrocities during 
hostilities on civilian populations where many of their victims have been children. In other cases, 
children have been commanders of armed forces during combat where they have commanded 
atrocities hence committing crimes against humanity.  
Legally speaking, such child soldiers, like any other soldiers are responsible for violations of IHL and 
should be held accountable for their actions. 
 There are different schools of thought on this issue. One is championed by those who argue 
that children are incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong especially in situations when 
they act under pressure particularly from adults.  
For example McCarney argues that children are inept to understand what genocide constitutes since 
they are so traumatised by their experiences in war to be able to distinguish between right and 
wrong. Additionally, he adds that, ‘the power dynamics of social norms which demand the 
obedience of children to adults has to be taken into account when determining their intent to commit 
atrocities’132.  
 Numerous testimonies of child soldiers have revealed that there are circumstances where 
they were threatened with death and forced to kill even their kin. In such cases it is difficult to 
determine the individual role played by a child in a conflict as most of them act under duress. 
On the other hand, there are those who are of the opinion that those children suspected of having 
committed atrocities should be investigated and charged for their actions or else impunity will 
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encourage the use of children in armed conflicts to commit atrocities. Human rights organisations 
such as Amnesty International (AI) support the prosecutions of such child soldiers between 15 and 
18 years of age as long as the courts concerned implement fair trial guidelines in full and the 
possibility of the death penalty or life imprisonment without possibility of release are exempted from 
the charges.133 
 In case where child soldiers are suspected of having committed war crimes or other 
atrocities, international legal instruments are not specific on the rules to be followed in prosecuting 
them. 
The furthest any international instrument has gone in trying to address the issue, is the CRC which 
in article 40 (3) (a) requires that states parties establish a minimum age below which children shall be 
presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law.134  
Article 17 (4) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (CRWC) reiterates on 
the same point, in similar wording. These instruments, both of which Sudan is bound by, fail to 
clearly spell out the ‘age of criminal responsibility’135 thus leaving it upon states to decide. The major 
setback of article 17 is that often states decide to set very low ages of criminal responsibility.  
The principle of doli incapax (the rule in most common international laws that consider children, 
mostly between ages of 7-14 as lacking the capacity to commit a criminal offence unless proven 
otherwise) has constantly been violated and continuously ignored by states hence its ineffectiveness 
in international customary law.  
 In countries like Sudan where the age of criminal responsibility is relatively high136 a 
functional juvenile justice system is lacking to deal with child offenders hence child rights are still 
violated.  
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In cases where a child is arrested on grounds of being suspected of a crime her/his best interests are 
rarely considered thus violation of the CRC which in its Article 3137 calls for the protection and care 
of children in actions to do with them including actions by courts of law in order to ensure that their 
best interests are considered. Some states have even gone further and termed cruel prosecution of 
children as being in their best interest arguing that subjecting them to hard punishment might teach 
them to take responsibility for their actions. While there might be sense in teaching children to take 
responsibility for their actions, hard punishment is uncalled for especially when these children do 
not understand the intensity of those actions or when they were simply following the orders of an 
adult. Moreover records show that most young offenders are mostly petty offenders although this is 
different when it comes to situations of armed conflict where child soldiers may have been involved 
in atrocities. 
 Article 26 of the Rome Statute states that, ‘the Court (here meant by the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ)) shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time 
of the alleged commission of a crime.’138  
This makes it difficult for states parties to bring cases of under 18s before the international court. 
The only way this could be done is by prosecuting children in the ad hoc Criminal Tribunals 
established by the ICJ, for example the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) which have so far been silent on 
the issue of child soldiers and no children have been brought to any of the tribunals. 
 The fact that international instruments prohibit the use of child soldiers in armed conflict 
and readily spell out measures for adults who use children and who command children to execute 
atrocities but fail to categorically put into place measures to prosecute them is incomprehensible. 
Prosecution should be limited to cases where it can be proved beyond reasonable doubt that they 
were in full control of themselves and aware of the consequences of their actions, makes it difficult 
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to prosecute children who commit atrocities. What is worse is that this failure might encourage the 
use of children by adults to commit carnage in armed conflicts. 
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Chapter 5: The Conundrum of  Reintegration in Sudan 
5.1  Why is reintegration failing in Sudan? 
The reintegration process is viewed as the final and probably most important component of 
the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. As important as it is, this process 
has not received the attention that it deserves, neither in scholarly debates and literature, nor by 
governments. Hence, it continues to encounter various challenges in the world over even in 
countries like Sudan where cultural and traditional practices exist to help reintegrate children back 
into their respective communities. Why?  
I argue that the process is complex as it has many facets central to which is the arduous burden of 
turning ‘a soldier back into a child’139. This in well highlighted in the landmark Machel report which 
points out that the reintegration process has wide-ranging aims, different for each boy and girl 
involved including building emotional trust and reconciling them with their respective families and 
communities, providing access to education and developing a means of livelihood.140 The process 
therefore needs to be comprehensive and long term.  
A community-based approach in which families and communities play a central role in 
supporting former child soldiers is mostly advocated for. I argue, with reference to Sudan that this is 
not always enough and although it plays an important part in reintegration, it is only but a 
component of a large array of needs that need to converge for an ex-child soldier to be successfully 
reintegrated. 
Among the Dinka Bahr el Ghazal of Sudan, on return of a former child soldier, a spear 
master (beny bith) 141 is usually called upon by the child’s family to perform certain rituals. A specific 
day for the celebration/ritual is selected both by the beny bith and the child soldier’s family.  
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During the celebration, a goat or bull is slaughtered and the bile of the animal smeared on the 
forehead of the child. Smearing of the bile signifies that that particular day belongs to the child. The 
child also jumps over the goat or bull three times. This indicates that he is leaving all impurities 
behind. During the ritual, the beny bith commandeers the animal to pass urine which signifies that 
the child has been cleansed and accepted back to the community. 
This ritual is performed in order to free the ex-child soldier from bad spirits of the dead - those 
she/he might have killed and those killed in the war. The blood of these animals is symbolic in that 
it is believed to cast out demons and appease the dead for them not to harm the child. The rituals 
also cleanse community members from possession by the spirits of the dead. Only then can a child 
associate with relatives and community members once again.  
 The significance of these rituals and practices to the child’s emotional and psychological 
wellbeing is clear: they help soften links between the community and the child hence acceptance in 
the long run; they help the child have the surety of the backing of the community and a sense of 
belonging as well as give her/him the chance to have a new beginning.  
While from a psychological, social and emotional perspective, families and communities strive to 
bring some sort of ‘normalcy’ to former child soldiers, the fact that most families remain poor and 
the economic situation in Sudan ailing; lack of employment, lack of vocational training centres, lack 
of proper health care facilities etc, makes reintegration a far-away dream for many.  
Needless to mention that as a result of war most of these children missed out on education and even 
though young, say 13 or 14 years old, there is no way they are going to feel comfortable in lower 
classes like standard/primary one or two with younger children of 7 or 8 years old (literally half their 
age). 
For these reasons, communal efforts are very helpful but have to be complemented with other 
factors like education or vocational training that are also vital for reintegration. 142  
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Too often, reintegration efforts inappropriately single out children who in the past were 
recruited, thereby perpetrating stigma.143 Such separation has proved detrimental in a number of 
ways.  
In Sudan, several schools were established in the South in the aftermath of the conflict specifically 
for child soldiers. This situation meant that these children were isolated from others given that the 
major criterion for joining was a past of involvement in the armed conflict. 
Though meant for the betterment of former child soldiers, separating them made them targets of 
mockery from other children (as it was clear, whoever went to these schools was once a jenajesh). 
They were described in pejorative words that branded them as being barbaric, killing machines and 
cannibals (capable of eating anything, including human flesh). Some of these children succumbed to 
mockery as they were psychologically affected and dropped out of school. 
 On the other hand, due to lack of enough schools in Sudan, it proved difficult to isolate and 
attend to the needs of child soldiers separately as other children started joining such schools and 
soon the population was mixed. In such schools it was, and still is common to find ex-child soldiers 
lamped together at a corner on their own, most of them having no ‘friends’ to play with as too often 
they are older than those in the same class (school grade/level) or sometimes others avoid 
associating with them due to their past.  
This pattern seems to be recurrent in areas affected by child soldiery. A former boy soldier in 
Uganda attests to this, he remembers; 
Other children insult me and when I try to fight them they run to the teacher’s office. The teacher 
says ‘If your head is confused because you were abducted, don’t come and disturb others’. Then the 
teacher beat me up. I went back with my parents and now it’s a bit better.144 
 
 The fact that sometimes these children tend to be put together with younger one’s due to the 
pragmatic reason of having missed out on education and to catch up they have to join lower classes 
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where the average age is normally much lower than theirs, leads to former child soldier drop-outs. 
For the simple reason that these children them feel ashamed and left out. Those who do not drop 
out find their way of surviving most of the time by turning into bullies.  
 The latter phenomenon is well illustrated in the importance of drinking-water in schools. In 
an attempt to keep children in schools, the government of Sudan and other partners struggle to sink 
boreholes or wells near school locations so that pupils do not have to leave school during break-
times to look for water to quench their thirst. In most cases water points are far and children have to 
walk long distances and may not return to school due to fatigue and other reasons. 
So during break-times, due to the high number of pupils who try to get water from the same 
borehole, the older boys and girls tend to make their way first and faster to the water points than the 
younger ones. This is because they are strong enough to pump-out water from the borehole or well. 
In such spots it is common to find former child soldiers at the forefront as they are considered 
fierce and stronger. They tend to pump water for themselves first and then for their counterparts, 
usually considering their friends first or those from whom they’re soliciting for friendship. 
In such cases, it is evident that educational efforts meant to help reintegrate children tend to fail as 
they either drop-out of schools or are pre-occupied with other petty things like bullying others and 
soliciting for friendships in order to at least have ‘their place’ in schools, that they do not get the best 
out of education. 
 School-going has in some instances proved disadvantageous not only to former girl child 
soldiers but to girls in general. Due to culture and traditions that undermine girl-child education, 
most girls remain at home to do household chores like fetching water, cooking, cleaning, taking care 
of younger ones among many other things. 
It has become more evident that formal education structure may not provide the best reintegration 
option for certain groups of former child soldiers. For instance, girls who gave birth to babies or 
boys who became fathers while in combat and are therefore mothers or fathers at demobilisation. In 
such cases, vocational training should be encouraged. 
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The setback in such cases (in line with my theory on post-colonial, post-conflict and post-CPA 
Sudan) is that the government is preoccupied with mobilising resources to build primary (let alone 
secondary) schools to even think of prioritising vocational centres which would otherwise benefit 
such children. 
 In areas where the need for vocational centres has been identified, most centres are owned 
and run national or international non-governmental organisations. These organisations more often 
than not do not follow one curriculum of teaching synchronised by a central body like the ministry 
of education. Since most of them have different donors and partners who tend to dictate the 
content teaching, sometimes irrelevant subject areas in the context of Sudan tend to be taught 
simply because donors fund them. For this reason, it is common to find large scores of trained 
hairdressers in Sudan, where hair saloons are a rare thing to come by. Where as tailors, carpenters 
and masons are on demand in the job market and training them in such areas would be more 
practical!  
 The girl child soldier problem. In most Sudanese communities, girls are viewed as property. 
In fact one mother is reported to have compared her daughter to a commodity that is taken to the 
market to be sold to the highest bidder.145  
Furthermore, in describing the place of Dinka women, Mading Deng writes that they  (women) 
provide the means to the more male-oriented goal of permanent identity and influence and that their 
destiny is almost universally marriage. He adds, ‘the Dinka say that the woman is a stranger who will 
leave her lineage to serve the ends of another lineage.’146 These perceptions of women are common 
in most parts of Sudan.  
 If this is the case for ordinary ‘normal’ women, one can only imagine the negativity in 
perception of girls who return from combat. Most of them suffer rejection as they are seen to have 
been tainted and dirtied and therefore worthless. In situations where former girl child soldiers have 
babies, matters are even more difficult. They are often stuck at crossroads - whether to return to 
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their families or stay with the fathers of their children (who may sometimes be former boy soldiers, 
commanders or regular soldiers). Often these girls are still in relationships as most depend on their 
partners for their livelihood and that of their children. In such cases, demobilisation in the first place 
is even difficult as such girls prefer to stay with their ‘husbands’ for the sake of an ‘assured’ 
livelihood and the wellbeing of their children (growing with both parents). 
Moreover, as seen in the above statement about Dinka women, a woman literally belongs to the 
family of her ‘husband.’ 
 In some cases where traditional elders intervene, a solution may often be found to enable the man 
(who has fathered the children) pay dowry for the girl and enable the two to be formally bound in 
marriage. Such situations deal demobilisation a harder blow as issues of best interest of the mother-
girl-child soldier come into play as well as those of her child/children. While the girl cannot leave 
her children, she also needs to be provided with a reasonable basis to find her way and help in 
fending for them. Save for how can she do this when she has to take care of the same children, her 
‘husband’, the homestead, and to some extent, the community in which she belongs - mostly the 
larger clan where she is married or lives with her children? What then happens in the case of death 
of the husband who in most cases is the ‘breadwinner?’ One can only wonder what will happen then 
to these girls. 
 Such are the factors that complicate demobilisation and reintegration. In such cases a 
community-approach is normally encouraged but where the place of a woman is second to that of a 
man, then it is common that her rights will be violated and probably her best interests thrown to the 
wind. Interest that she has not only to compromise but to make do without for the sake of her 
children, her belonging, which she gets by accepting to stay in her marital home and albeit in a small 
way, a chance to reclaim her lost dignity in the name of ‘motherhood’ and that of ‘being somebody’s 
wife’.  
At reintegration, such issues tend to be ignored and former child soldiers regardless of gender and 
specific needs tend to be lamped together as ‘ex-combatants’ hence, failure of the reintegration 
process. 
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 Some experts have singled out that “Girl mothers require special attention to have access to 
education and livelihood support, in such forms as day care for their children.”147  
Generally, this may not be a bad strategy if such facilities were available in the required proportions 
throughout the world, unfortunately they are not, least of all in the so-called developing world, 
Sudan included. Firstly, day care services are as scarce as oases in a desert in Sudan as most women 
prefer to take care of their children by themselves or get help from their kin.  
Secondly, where day care services are available, they are so expensive that most middle class families 
cannot afford them, least of all girls. Again, here we notice a problem of one-solution-fit-all 
circumstances, where organisations operating under the banner of ‘internationalisation’ tend to 
dictate what should be done in the world over (for example the provision of day care centres), not 
recognising the differences that exist in various societal contexts. 
 As if that is not enough, sometimes these girls suffer psychological stress as some of them 
were sexually abused, raped, gang raped, impregnated and overworked while in combat. They 
therefore not only require extra psychosocial counselling, but also testing for Sexually Transmitted 
Diseases (STDs) like HIV/AIDS and others and treatment in the event of positive results. 
Then again, in recognising the uniqueness of the experiences of former girl child soldiers, it is easy 
to forget boy child soldiers who were sexually exploited while in combat. 
Singer reminds us that the assumption that only girls were subjected to sexual exploitation during a 
war is true but largely hinders a holistic approach to the reintegration issue as it excludes boy 
children who were also sexually abused. This assumption has made it difficult for ex-boy soldiers, 
who mostly shy away from admitting they were sexually abused to access treatment or psychosocial 
help. 
 Vocational training as an option. In some parts of Sudan vocational training has played a 
significant role in the reintegration process. Scores of girls and boys have been graduated as 
carpenters, tailors, hairdressers, masons etc and have been employed in relevant firms. 
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The major setback is that only a limited number of these children can secure employment at the end 
of their training while most are left jobless. 
There is also a severe dearth of centres or programmes from which these children can acquire capital 
to start their own businesses and be self-employed. Most of them end up doing petty jobs at market 
places and getting meagre pays. 
 Child participation. Most scholars have noted that in designing reintegration programmes 
most governments rarely consult affected children. This lack of participation means that most 
programmes are bound to be insensitive to the needs of children and eventually fail, as they fall 
short of addressing fundamental issues. Most governments and organisations have a DDR package 
containing what is to be done to each child and fail to acknowledge that each child’s experience in 
combat is unique and deserves particular attention. For example some children, prefer vocational 
training to primary, or formal education for that matter. Since “rules that have to be adhered to,” 
former child soldiers are pushed into primary schools with children half their age and for various 
reasons, some of which are mentioned above, they drop out. 
 To add insult to injury, denial by GoS, not to have used children in it ranks made 
demobilisation and resultant reintegration efforts in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the 
CPA difficult as most child soldiers in northern Sudan were not subjected to formal DDR processes. 
This meant that most of them went back to the community without any form of assistance. 
 Even though the SPLA admitted having used children, there was a somewhat reluctance to admit 
that girls were part of the group. This is because most commanders and other members wanted to 
retain girls as their wives. This factor made it difficult to formally demobilise girls and continues to 
impede reintegration efforts to date. 
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This feature is not specific to Sudan. In Mozambique for instance, it was reported that 40 percent of 
2000 child soldiers found at RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) bases in 1994 were girls 
while at demobilisation, females comprised only 1.5 percent of the combatants.148 
 Due to children’s vulnerability, the experience of child soldiering often results to trauma. 
Trauma refers to an emotional shock which may generate lasting effects on the child. Research has 
revealed that a large percentage of child soldiers suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 
As a matter of fact, research conducted on child soldiers in the Republic of Congo (RC) found out 
that, in varying degrees, 40% of them could not sleep (suffered insomnia), 50% had nightmares, 
28% felt threatened (by other people) and 25% remained quiet (suffered from some sort of mutism 
which made them to withdraw and isolate themselves).149  
 In Sudan most children suffer what can be termed as a ‘human-to-human trauma’150. This 
means that they have witnessed the physical killing of a human being (in most cases close relatives 
like parents, sisters and brothers, or close friends) by another. In such situations, scientists 
recommend family protection as a remedy for rehabilitation.  
In cases where parents have died, former child soldiers are normally entrusted to the guardianship of 
a close relative or sometimes a ‘chief’151.  
In taking care of such children, relatives or community members more often than not interpret their 
experiences in the bush as having put them through a hard life, having survived it to them means 
that they have passed the litmus test of being self-reliant. They often expect former child soldiers, 
especially boys to assist in fending for the family. In some cases it may auger ‘well’ and children can 
combine laborious chores with going to school or for training. Other times, children cannot keep up 
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and they escape. This leaves them with no forms of protection and makes them susceptible to re-
recruitment.  
 In cases where former child soldiers manage to access psycho-social help; there is normally 
no form of follow-up after a given period of time to monitor their progress. Assistance ends with 
their release from DDR centres. This greatly deters their reintegration as such children continue to 
suffer war related trauma many years after their demobilisation or after the end of war. 
These points, coupled with the fact that demobilisation and reintegration processes take long leaving 
most children frustrated and disillusioned, make former child soldiers susceptible to re-recruitment. 
5.2  Re-recruitment of Former Child Soldiers: the Danger Posed by 
Darfur 
5.2.1 Synopsis of the Conflict in Darfur 
 “Darfur” is a word combination of the Arabic word dar (home, abode) and the name of the 
main ethnic group, the Fur, which are said to have inhabited the region since the middle ages. The 
region is divided into three states: northern Darfur (Shamal Darfur), western Darfur (Gharb Darfur) 
and southern Darfur (Janub Darfur). The region is largely an arid plateau with the north 
characterised by sandy deserts and the south, bush forests. 
 In terms of administration, Darfur was an independent sultanate until 1874 when its then 
Sultan, Muhammad ‘Ali was overthrown. He was overthrown by a slave trader al-Zubayr Rahma 
Mansur who was later also overthrown in a religious rebellion headed by Muhammad Ahmad al-
Mahdi in 1885. The invasion of the Sultanate by Anglo-Egyptian troops saw its capture in 1898 and 
Darfur came under the control of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. 
 Darfurians traded mostly on slaves; ‘the trade was managed by Sultans who levied taxes on 
traders and export duties on slaves sent to Egypt, and took a share of the slaves brought into Dar 
Fur’152. As time went by, it is said that some household slaves rose to prominent ranks in the sultan’s 
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courts and exercised power over the local population. This upset the traditional class of the Fur 
which fostered a counter-Mahdiyya opposition. The sultanate briefly revived itself after the 
overthrow of the Mahdist State by Anglo-Egyptian forces, and maintained an independent existence 
until its final conquest and incorporation into the Sudan in 1916.153  
The trans-African pilgrimage route to Mecca passes through Darfur, and as it is common to life, 
returning pilgrims sojourned or settled, enriching the local variant of Islam. This contributed to 
Darfur being overwhelmingly Muslim even without being comprised of Arabs.  
 This fact rules out the possibility of a religious war which partly characterised the long civil 
war between southern and northern Sudan.  
Moreover, it is said that the Islam practiced in different parts of Darfur adopted local characteristics. 
Collins Robert notes that, ‘the Islam practiced by the Fur and Masalit had adopted many African 
syncretic rituals in their observance that distinguished the indigenous Islam of Western Darfur from 
the more orthodox Islam of the Darfuris east of the Jabal Marra practiced by the Birgid, Mima, and 
Berti which has traditionally marked the divide between Islamization and Arabization in Darfur’154.  
Due to interaction and intermarriages, Arabic became the main language in the region. Slowly it 
began to be used in schools, market places and the royal courts rendered it the lingua Franca of the 
region. The wide acceptance and use of Arabic provided no motivation to learn the Fur language 
and there were fears of its extinction. 
 What we see happening presently in Darfur is said to have its genesis in the 1980s, when 
against a backdrop of environmental degradation, a drought hit the region and land became a 
contentious issue and a reason to take up arms against each other. Traditionally, it would be normal 
in such a region for tribal wars, cattle rustling and crop theft to occur. However what Darfurians, 
(Gos) and the people of Sudan in general took for granted was the presence of more ‘sophisticated’ 
weapons in the area. The politically unstable situation in neighbouring countries like Chad and the 
Central African Republic (CAR) allowed for a proliferation of arms into the region. Guns, machetes 
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and other fighting equipment could cheaply be acquired across the borders from Libya and rebels 
from neighbouring countries could be hired to lend a hand in looting and raiding.  
With a persistent drought and a failed security apparatus, the situation slowly got out of hand and 
the government’s weakness to remedy the state of affairs and its manipulation of the ethnic fabric of 
the region gradually shifted the nature of the conflict and ethnicity took centre stage. 
 The chaotic situation was infused with sinister calls for Arab supremacy evidently from the 
Northern government and Libya. The power of Pan-Arabist ideology (as we have seen in chapter 1), 
however fictitious its actual base might have been, connected local groups to a wider international 
community that gave room for a mobilisation of support for the internal conflict in Darfur at the 
time.  
Preoccupied with the war in the South at the time, GoS dismissed the fighting in Darfur as merely 
tribal and assured the world that the situation was under control. With no help from the central 
authority, different tribes, people and groups that were affected by the attacks took matters into 
their own hands and defended themselves, their families and property (again, failure of the state to 
effect and mobilise security apparatuses). This resulted to the formation of the first rebel group, the 
janjaweed, mainly comprised of the Rizeigat, Taisha, Habbanyia, Misseiria and Baqqara.155 The word 
janjaweed locals say refers to a man on horse-back.  
 By 1989, 5000 Fur had been killed and 40,000 of their homes destroyed, as against 400 Arabs 
killed and 700 tents burned.156 Low intensity conflict continued until early 2003, when a number of 
interacting factors led to the formation of two anti-government political and military resistance 
movements, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM).157 The two militia groups emerged mostly to counter attack the janjaweed, the main group 
that was terrorising the locals especially non-Arabs.  
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5.2.2 Re-recruitment of Former Child Soldiers by Armed Groups in Darfur 
 Following a string of ‘victories’ in 2003 from the SLM and JEM, it is reported that the 
government in Khartoum adopted a scorch earth strategy that heavily relied on the janjaweed and 
regular government armed forces. The intention to sweep-off the local population was clear as new 
strategies and techniques were put into practice:  
First aircrafts would come over a village, as if smelling the target, then return to release their 
bombs.158 With open rear ramps, transport aircrafts would drop bombs onto targeted civilians. 
Combat helicopters would then follow targeting any buildings like schools, houses or mosques, still 
standing.  
To ensure that the job was well done, the janjaweed would arrive either on their own or in the 
company of regular army troops, surround the targeted area and unleash their hate. It is during these 
ordeals that girls and women were raped and branded with hot iron so as to be recognized later as 
‘tainted’, leaving them permanently tormented.  
Valuables were stolen, animals either rustled or killed, houses torched down and anything that was 
still alive killed. Children being light were sometimes tossed into burning houses and girl children 
abducted. Reports by survivors stated that verbal insults such as Zurqa (“Black”) and abid (“slaves”) 
were hurled at them.159 
 The use of ‘sophisticated’ war machinery such as transport planes, Antonovs, guns and 
others points to the involvement of a superior power with some capacity (legal capacity) to afford 
and acquire such weapons in the conflict. It would be extremely expensive for a local militia, with no 
source of funds, in a poverty stricken area like Darfur to afford such artillery.  
Moreover, given that the janjaweed were operating in the company of regular army troops is suspect 
and evident of government participation. That the attacks were well meditated co-ordinated and 
only launched on selected villages indicates a clear intension to sweep off a certain people.  
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 The government has been unable to halt the ongoing conflict in Darfur. The Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) of 2006 was only signed by one faction of the SLM, SLM-Minnawi and the 
government of Sudan. It was rejected by JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) and other factions 
which claimed that the DPA failed to sufficiently address issues of power-sharing, representation in 
government, disarmament of the Janjaweed militia and provide for a victim’s compensation fund. 
Thus it failed to bring about a permanent and total ceasefire in the area.  
 Given that reintegration efforts mostly in the South take long and children are left in 
reintegration- and internally displaced persons’ (IDPs) camps for long makes them susceptible to re-
recruitment. The on-going conflict in Darfur provides fertile ground for their re-recruitment not so 
far away from home. 
 The UN reported the recruitment and use of 487 children by various armed groups 
operating in all three Darfur states with a majority taking place in the Western state. The 
fragmentation and proliferation of opposition armed groups have created fertile ground for 
recruitment, with over 14 Sudanese and foreign armed groups identified in the region for recruiting 
and using Children.  
These groups include, Chadian rebel forces, government forces including Sudan Armed Forces 
(SAF), government of Sudan-allied militias (Janjaweed), Central Reserve Police, the Sudan Liberation 
Army (SLA)/Minni Minnawi, SLA (Abu Gasim)/Mother Wing, SLA (Free Will), SLA (Abdul 
Wahid), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM(Peace Wing)), and the Popular Defence Forces.160 
 The fact that poverty levels in Darfur like else where in Sudan are high and that rebel groups 
pay, makes joining these groups even more attractive.  
Prunier states that, “recruits were paid what amounted to a good salary in the economic 
circumstances of the region; $ 79 a month for a man on foot and $117 if he had a horse or camel.”161 
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Officers-i.e. those who could read or who were tribal commanders (amir) could get as much as 
$233.162  
Armed groups in Darfur and the neighbouring countries of Chad, Central African Republic (CAR) 
and Uganda (northern Uganda) are not the only ones recruiting children. In some states, the SPLA 
has been reported to be including previously registered children in troop movements prior to the 
children being officially released. Participation of children in SAF has also been witnessed in the 
areas around Abyei.163 
5.3 Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers: A Global Challenge  
 Given that child soldiery is not only an issue in Sudan but in many nations of the world, 
makes it a global problem.  
On DDR, the CPA called for the mobilisation of adequate financial and logistical support by the 
international community including governments, governmental agencies, humanitarian organisations 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).164 It further called upon organisations like UNICEF, 
the ICRC and other international organisations to assist in the child component of the DDR in 
Sudan.165 The call for support from the international community signifies the novelty as well as 
universality of the DDR phenomenon. Appealing for help from the international community shows 
that Sudan recognises the importance of involving other international players in matters concerning 
children in the country. 
 Moreover, given that the rights and freedoms of children are enshrined and protected in IHL 
instruments, international conventions, covenant declarations and rules just goes to show how 
global reintegration really is. The reaction of people in different parts of the world has proved 
helpful and bolstered cooperation among them in order to rid ‘the world’s children’ the risk of 
enlistment in armed conflict. 
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Hopes to combat the vice are kept alive more by the global response we are witnessing to mass 
human catastrophes that tend to overshadow local undertakings; ‘when the world’s public reacts; it 
also demands a meaningful response from governments’166 (the government of Sudan included).  
In this vein it is important for the government to work with NGOs, active in Sudan, that champion 
a child-rights approach and which have expertise on child- and human rights like UNICEF, Save the 
Children Alliance (SCA), ICRC and others to ensure that reintegration is successful. 
 In Sudan however, there is no cohesive coordination of reintegration activities between the 
government and non-governmental organisations (local or international). Operations tend to be 
done by individual organisations in their own terms hence multi-standards. Additionally, 
governmental funds directed towards reintegration are scarce thus heavy reliance on international 
humanitarian organisations. This has proved helpful at times but other times, it has been detrimental 
to reintegration as sometimes these organisations have limited capacities and not familiar with 
existent cultures and perceptions. As Singer points out, outside governments and agencies have been 
ill prepared to deal with the increased number of children in war. For example, within the US 
(United States) government, the responsibilities for backing disarmament and demobilisation efforts 
are disjointed, spread out over a number of federal agencies, and often have little pragmatic expertise 
on how to respond to the growing use of child soldiers.167 Thus bogus mechanisms which don’t help 
children as anticipated tend to be put in place. Their emulation without prior regard to context is 
what in my opinion has been even more detrimental to reintegration activities. 
 On the other hand, many international organisations working in Sudan have different goals 
and objectives. Sometimes these goals vary distinctly from those of government and staff of such 
organisations is expelled. 
Security hiccups also hinder the smooth running of international organisations. 
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The ICRC for example has been working in Sudan since 1978168. Its roles include, inter alia, tracing 
relatives of unaccompanied refugee children including child soldiers, supplying household items, 
fishing kits, tools, seed and food to thousands of displaced people and providing them and residents 
with access to clean drinking.  
In 2009, for instance, two of the CRC’s expatriate staff (one of whom was released on 6 February 
2010 after 89 days in captivity) was kidnapped in Western Darfur and eastern Chad.169 
The GoNU should as a matter of international responsibility and in show of bona fides (good faith) 
ensure maintenance of ample security for the staff and property of such organisations in order for 
them to work optimally. It should also work hand-in-hand with these organisations to ensure that 
the families of former child soldiers are retraced and children not only reunited with their families 
but also that they are well reintegrated. 
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6. Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research 
 An examination of the history of Sudan has revealed that problems that emanated during the 
colonial period were consequently carried forward to the post-colonial era. These problems were not 
aptly addressed by successive post-colonial governments and these led to their expansion and later 
civil wars. It took a long period of negotiations, characterised by disagreements that further resorted 
to war and hatred among the warring factions, simply put, between northern and southern Sudan. 
Even after the signing of the CPA, the refusal of the northern based government of Sudan to sign 
the Abyei boundaries treaty resulted to fighting in the area that spread so fast to the neighbouring 
areas showing just how fragile the peace in Sudan still is.  
It is important as discussed in the theories of conflict and conflict resolution above, that parties to 
the CPA continuously engage in dialogue and negotiations aimed at minimising their 
incompatibilities so that with time, sustainable peace may be achieved.  
Additionally, it is clear that a situation of war cannot ensure sufficient protection of children. As 
revealed in the various chapters of this thesis, the existence of war provides fertile ground for the 
conscription of children into armed forces and especially by irregular armed groups. The prevalence 
of peace in Sudan is therefore an important constituent that will prevent the exposure of children to 
conflict and consequently stop their recruitment. 
 
 The problematic of using one universal definition of children as persons under 18 years old 
and therefore former child soldiers as those persons younger than 18 who have participated in 
armed forces or groups – either on voluntary basis or by coercion – directly or in a supporting 
function where participation includes fighting, guarding, cooking, or serving as a porter, messenger, 
spy or sex slave, cannot be ignored. 
Different cultures view children differently and their beliefs, traditions and contexts determine how 
they define a child. These definitions vary widely from one society to another. In this regard, it is 
difficult to tag a number and use it for children universally. 
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Nevertheless, the fact that Sudan has ratified international instruments like the CRC which recognise 
persons under 18 years as children means that it is bound de jure by those instruments.  
 Ratification of international child rights instruments means that states parties undertake to 
protect children (under 18s) within their jurisdiction from exploitation and abuse, including 
protection from recruitment and enlistment into armed groups and forces. Post-conflict or not, a 
state is bound by these treaties and conventions and failure to uphold them equals a breach of 
international law. The commitment to uphold child rights at all times is lacking in Sudan. This lack 
of commitment, at times cased by what I have called a priority crisis is what causes a post-conflict 
state like Sudan to shove the issue of reintegration of former child soldiers to the side ignoring their 
plight. Among other factors this leads not only to failure in reintegration but also to constant abuse 
of children’s rights. 
 
 The factors that pulled children into armed conflict in Sudan were numerous; poverty, the 
presence of war, the appeal to a sense of patriotism, the urge to revenge past grievances, the list is 
endless! The fact that the CPA brought a considerable share of peace is remarkable but this, as 
illustrated in the life cycle of conflict, does not mean that Sudan is in a state of no conflict, it is to a 
certain degree still in conflict. These issues have not been fully addressed, for example poverty is still 
the main incentive that leads to the re-recruitment of former child soldiers.  
For progress in reintegration to be realised, it is crucial that the root causes that drove children to 
conflict in the first place be addressed. This is the only way that the lost childhoods of these children 
can be restored and recruitment and the temptation of indulgence into armed conflict be stopped. 
 
 In spite of the existence of traditional approaches that provide an important cornerstone to 
former child soldiers’ psychological and emotional healing and enable their acceptance back into 
respective communities, on their own, are not enough to ensure optimal reintegration.  
 79 
As discussed in this paper, what I call effective reintegration cannot be realised if traditional 
approaches are not complemented with such vital life-skills-acquisition mechanisms as education 
and/or training and eventually employment.  
 Additionally, in some tribal groups where it has been found out that a child soldier was 
involved in killing a member of another tribal group or clan, compensation is usually demanded. 
Failure to pay the demanded amount, either in cash or in kind leads to revenge attacks in the name 
of retribution. In such cases, an institutionalised form of assistance for poor tribes and or clans 
would be a step in avoiding internal conflicts. 
 
 The observable fact of child soldiering as we know it today is a relatively new one. Although 
Africa has been hard hit by it, child soldiering is not sui generis to the continent but common in the 
world over. Internationalisation of the issue, although unconstructive to countries and therefore 
children at times, can be a good platform to share experiences and promote best practices when it 
comes to devising reintegration programmes. Local, national and especially international 
organisations can play an instrumental role in sensitising the world of the consequences of child 
soldiering. 
Nevertheless, the global nature of the issue does not and should not give governments an escape 
channel to abscond their duties to their people.  
Though young, in the sense that most of its territory (except Darfur) is emerging from a long period 
of conflict, the republic of the Sudan needs to prioritise the needs of children, especially vulnerable 
groups of children like former child soldiers at this stage of peace building if peace is to be 
maintained within its borders. Not addressing the issue of child soldiers has so far proved 
detrimental to the government as it’s national security is jeopardised. 
This is seen in the way that former child soldiers are hired by various tribal groups to raid other 
neighbouring tribes. It is also common to find former child soldiers in vigilante groups. Most of 
them claim lack of employment or apathy as a cause for their involvement in crime. 
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Out of frustration and sometimes confusion of how to rid themselves of the torments of war, some 
of these children resort to alcoholism, and drug use and abuse. Some of them become juvenile 
delinquents, a growing phenomenon in Sudanese town centres. 
 
 Article 2 (a) of the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) prohibits the 
recruitment of children in armed conflict. In detail, it out rightly prohibits: 
‘All forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt 
bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment 
of children for use in armed conflict.’170 
From this article, and other legal instruments discussed in this thesis, it is clear that involvement of 
children in armed conflict is damaging to their wellbeing in many ways, worst among them is the 
ripping off of their precious childhoods.  
 On the other hand, the fact that children have been used in armed conflict and in some cases 
have been perpetrators of the worst forms of violence cannot be thrown out of the window since 
this might encourage the use of children to commit atrocities. To this end, there is need to put in 
place laws that bar adults from using children as well as those that make it possible to prosecute 
young offenders for atrocities they have committed in armed conflicts so long as their best interests 
is taken into consideration. And they are subjected to fair trial without the possibility of being 
subjected to a death sentence or life imprisonment without possibility of release.  
Some organisations like ACT (the Action Plan Project for Children in Armed Conflict) have taken a 
bold step and called for the ‘establishment of a specialised international tribunal on War Crimes 
against Children’171 as a result of the increase in the number of child perpetrators of war crimes. The 
establishment of such a court, it is hoped will discourage the use of children in hostilities as well as 
bar children themselves from committing atrocities. 
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 Nonetheless, the reintegration of former child soldiers back into their respective societies is 
quintessential to restoring this lost childhoods. As this paper has shown, there is neither one single 
and perfect way to approach reintegration nor are there a perfectly knitted set of rules laid down for 
reintegration. Instead, several, fundamental factors unique to particular contexts need to be 
identified and engaged and if need be, tweaked, to the needs of former child soldiers in those 
contexts.  
In the same vein, reintegration and all the processes and activities involved in rehabilitation former 
child soldiers, should not be seen as independent variables. Rather, they should be perceived as part 
of an overall strategy that works towards restoring the lost opportunity of childhood and securing a 
future for this group of children. 
 
 Shortcoming of this research and suggestions for future research: 
A major impediment to effective reintegration pointed out in this thesis is that children are rarely 
involved when designing DDR programmes. Their opinion is hardly ever sought. An impediment to 
which, for pragmatic reasons, this paper has succumbed to, to a certain extend. In an attempt to 
delve deeper into the reintegration question, it would be valuable if future researches in this area 
included interviews from children, government officials and humanitarian workers as part of their 
research methodology. 
 
 Literature on child soldiers has also largely ignored comparative in depth research carried out 
over time. Different accounts of child-and former child soldiers from different countries are 
normally given, but rarely a comparative study of what happens to children in post-conflict 
situations after being reunified with families in a given period of time. Research in this direction 
would shed more light not only on the DDR processes but also monitor adaptation of former child 
soldiers to their new environments.  
This, I believe will provide a solid basis for the sharing of experiences and probably lead to best 
practices not only in reintegration but in dealing with issues surrounding child soldiers in general. 
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